Innovation and Production in the Global Economy by Costas Arkolakis et al.
Innovation and Production in the Global Economy￿
Costas Arkolakis
Princeton, Yale and NBER
Natalia Ramondo
Arizona State
Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
UC Berkeley and NBER
Stephen Yeaple
Penn State and NBER
April 2013
Abstract
One feature of globalization is that countries are increasingly specialized in either in-
novation or in production. To understand the forces behind this specialization and its
welfare consequences, we develop a monopolistic competition model of trade and multi-
national production (MP) in which ﬁrms face a tradeoff between producing close to cus-
tomers and producing in the least-cost location. At the country level, the location of
innovation and production is determined by comparative advantage and home market
effects that arise from the interaction of trade and MP costs with increasing returns to
scale. The model yields simple structural expressions for bilateral trade and MP that we
use to calibrate the model across a set of OECD countries. Our counterfactual exercises
shed light on the effect of falling MP costs, and the entry of China into world markets, on
welfare between and within countries.
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One consequence of globalization is that goods are increasingly being produced far from
where ideas are created. This international specialization in innovation or production is
clearly evident in the aggregate data. Figure 1 shows that the most innovative OECD coun-
tries, as measured by R&D expenditures in manufacturing relative to local value-added, are
home to multinationals whose foreign afﬁliate sales exceed the sales of foreign multinational
afﬁliates in their country. With increasing globalization, this pattern has also become more
pronounced. Figure 2 shows that R&D expenditures relative to manufacturing value-added
in the United States has grown from 8.7% in 1999 to 12.7% in 2009. Over the same period,
American ﬁrms have increased the share of their total global employment that is located in
their foreign afﬁliates from 22% to 31%.1
This phenomenon raises a set of important questions. How does the increasing ability to
locate production abroad affect the geography of innovation and national welfare? Do some
countries gain more than others? Could some countries be made worse off? Are workers in
some countries harmed in the process? To tackle these questions, we develop a quantitative,
multi-country general equilibrium model that builds on the established theory of interna-
tional trade, but that allows ﬁrms to separate innovation and production geographically.
Following Melitz (2003), we model innovation as the creation of heterogeneous ﬁrms that
sell differentiated goods in monopolistically competitive markets that are separated by ﬁxed
and variable trade costs. We depart from the Melitz model by assuming that ﬁrms can locate
production outside of their home market with the productivity levels across locations drawn
from a multivariate distribution. In deciding where to produce to serve a particular market,
ﬁrms face a trade off between being close to their customers to avoid trade costs and produc-
ing in the country where they would achieve the minimum unit cost. By allowing ﬁrms to
produceoutsideoftheirhomecountry, multinationalproduction(MP)allowssomecountries
to specialize in innovation and others to specialize in production.2 Countries that specialize
in innovation have a net inﬂow of proﬁts that compensates for the cost of innovation; loosely
speaking, these countries export ideas and import goods.
There are two forces that determine the allocation of innovation across countries: First,
countries that have a high productivity in innovation relative to production tend to specialize
1Among the fastest growing destinations for the foreign afﬁliates of U.S. multinationals is China, which now
accounts for one in eight employees of the foreign afﬁliates of U.S. ﬁrms.
2In the absence of MP, the share of labor devoted to innovation would be the same in all countries. This
is consistent with the version of the Melitz model presented in Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (2008), where entry is endogenous, but not affected by trade costs. An equivalent result is derived by
Eaton and Kortum (2001) in a setting with Bertrand competition.
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Figure 1: R&D and Net MP
Note: R&D expenditure in manufacturing value-added is from OECD STAN for 1999. Net MP is deﬁned as
outward afﬁliate sales - inward afﬁliate sales divided by their sum. Data construction for MP is described in
the appendix.
Figure 2: R&D and Employment of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms and multinationals
Note: Sources OECD STAN, US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The employment share of US ﬁrms at their
foreign afﬁliates is deﬁned as total employment of US majority-owned, manufacturing afﬁliates abroad
divided by total US manufacturing employment plus US majority-owned, manufacturing afﬁliates abroad
minus the employment of the afﬁliates of foreign-owned manufacturing afﬁliates operating in the US.
2in innovation; and second, home market effects (HME) imply that country size and location
affect the allocation of production and innovation. HMEs lead production to concentrate
in countries with large “market potential,” while they draw innovation towards countries
with large “production potential,” i.e., countries that have a large labor force or that are
well connected to such countries. We can think of the ﬁrst of these forces as a “comparative
advantage in innovation” while the second force is related to the proximity to consumers (for
production) and workers (for innovation).
The model provides a natural environment in which to explore the implications of MP on
real wages. This turns out to depend critically on the assumptions regarding the ability of
workers to move between production and innovation sectors. In the theory section we ﬁrst
consider a “speciﬁc-factors” version of the model in which there is no labor mobility between
sectors. In this case we ﬁnd a result that resonates with the popular view on the effect of MP
on wages: by moving production abroad, multinationals can lower the real wage of pro-
duction workers in countries that have a comparative advantage in innovation. In contrast,
under perfect labor mobility between innovation and production and with frictionless trade,
we show that, starting from a scenario with no MP, eliminating all barriers to MP necessarily
leads to an increase in real wages everywhere. This strong result depends, however, on the
assumption that trade is frictionless and all barriers to MP are eliminated. For example, a
unilateral reduction in inward MP costs can make a country worse off, because of a resulting
contraction of innovation and expansion of production that worsen the country’s terms of
trade.
To arrive at more precise conclusions regarding the impact of MP on the geography of
innovation and welfare in our multi-country general equilibrium setting, we calibrate the
model to data for 18 OECD countries and then perform a series of counterfactual exercises.
We start by deriving a novel implication of our model, namely that trade ﬂows by the par-
ents and afﬁliates of ﬁrms from a given country are more sensitive to trade costs than overall
trade ﬂows. Using high quality data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on the sales of
U.S. ﬁrms and their foreign afﬁliates, we estimate a gravity equation that partially identiﬁes
key structural parameters of our model. We then re-estimate the same equation on overall
trade ﬂows, obtaining an additional target for our calibration and conﬁrming the model’s
implication regarding relative trade cost sensitivities. The rest of the calibration is very par-
simonious: we avoid adding extraneous elements to the theory and simply ﬁnd the trade
and MP costs that make the model perfectly ﬁt the bilateral trade and MP ﬂows in the data.
As mentioned above, the effect of MP on the location of innovation and on welfare de-
pends on the assumptions regarding labor mobility between innovation and production. For
3thequantitativeanalysis, wefocusonacasethatiseasytocalibrateandyetcombinesfeatures
of the two extreme cases considered in the theoretical analysis. In particular, we assume that,
as in Roy (1951), there is perfect labor-mobility across sectors but workers are heterogeneous
in their abilities in innovation and production.
We use the calibrated model to perform two counterfactual exercises. First, we consider a
5% reduction in all MP costs from their calibrated levels. This results in greater specialization
across countries in innovation and production and real incomes rise on average by about 2%.
Perhaps surprisingly, production workers gain everywhere, and it is workers employed in
innovation who experience losses in some countries. Countries that are initially less innov-
ative, such as the southern European countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, are those
suffering a decline in innovation and in the real income of workers employed in innovation.
Second, we explore the implications of the integration of China to the world economy. In this
exercise, developed countries are induced to follow the “Apple model:” they specialize in in-
novation and China becomes a key manufacturing center for the whole world. Contrary to
popular fears, production workers in all countries gain, although workers initially employed
in innovation beneﬁt by more than those employed in production.
The mechanisms at work in our model have antecedents in the classic work on trade and
MP (see Markusen (2002)). This literature highlights four key ideas: (i) MP allows innovation
(entry) to be geographically separated from production; (ii) countries differ in their relative
costs in innovation and production, which leads to a tendency toward specialization in one
of these two activities; (iii) the non-rivalry of technology within the ﬁrm allows multi-plant
production; and (iv) trade costs encourage while MP costs discourage multi-plant produc-
tion. The incorporation of these features into a general-equilibrium trade model dates back
to Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984).3 By modeling ﬁrm-level productivity in different
countries as coming from a multivariate distribution and by replacing plant-level ﬁxed costs
with marketing ﬁxed costs, we gain the ability to construct a tractable, quantiﬁable, and
multi-country model that incorporates the most important mechanisms found in this earlier
work.
Our model provides a strict generalization of the Melitz (2003) model of trade as speci-
ﬁed by Chaney (2008). In particular, when MP costs go to inﬁnity, our model collapses to
a general equilibrium version of that model with endogenous entry (as in Arkolakis et al.
3Examples of work that most closely resembles our own are Markusen and Venables (1998) and Markusen
and Venables (2000) in which the authors analyze the interaction between comparative advantage in production
and innovation, trade costs, and plant and corporate ﬁxed costs in a two-country, Heckscher-Ohlin-like setting.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) extend this framework to an endogenous growth setting in which the more
efﬁcient use of the world’s resources made possible by MP may affect the long-run growth rate in rich and poor
countries.
4(2008)). Our approach has signiﬁcant differences with another strict generalization of the
Melitz model that allows for MP, namely Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (henceforth
HMY). First, our general equilibrium approach allows us to think about how comparative
advantage and home market effects lead some countries to specialize in innovation and ex-
hibit net outward MP, while others specialize in production and exhibit net inward MP. Sec-
ond, our probabilistic approach to the modeling of productivity across multiple production
locations makes it easy to capture how multinational afﬁliates use certain countries as export
platforms, while this would lead to severe computational problems in HMY. Finally, we use
our calibrated model to perform counterfactual analysis and provide quantitative answers
to the questions raised above regarding the effect of MP on welfare and the location of inno-
vation.
One potential drawback of our approach relative to HMY (and the quantitative appli-
cation of their framework by Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2012)) is that we do not
allow for ﬁxed costs of running foreign afﬁliates. Thus, our model does not have a proximity-
concentration trade-off. This simpliﬁcation allows us to avoid a very complex discrete-choice
problem and gives us the necessary tractability to handle export platforms and international
specialization in innovation and production. A recent paper by Tintelnot (2012) develops
a model that allows for export platforms with ﬁxed costs of production. His paper, how-
ever, abstracts from entry and so is not equipped to analyze international specialization in
innovation and production, which is the focus of our paper.
A close relative to our model is Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), which extends the
perfect competition Ricardian framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to allow for MP (and
“intra-ﬁrm” trade). Whereas both models have similar expressions for aggregate trade and
MP ﬂows, the perfectly competitive framework of Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013)
does not allow for proﬁts and innovation, which play critical roles in our analysis.4 Also
related are Eaton and Kortum (2007) and Rodríguez-Clare (2010), which develop theories to
show how technology diffusion or offshoring may lead countries to specialize in innovation
or production.
BursteinandMonge-Naranjo(2009), McGrattanandPrescott(2010), andMcGrattan(2011)
also study the impact of MP on welfare. These papers extend the neoclassical growth model
by introducing a rival “managerial capital” or a non-rival “knowledge capital” that can be
used in any location. The movement of managerial or knowledge capital from one country
to another is interpreted as MP, while trade takes place only as a way to transfer the returns
to capital. We think of our approaches as complementary: While our model can more eas-
4Another relevant contribution is Ramondo (2012), who adapts the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework to
model MP (without trade). This model also has perfect competition, so there are no proﬁts and no innovation.
5ily connect to the trade and MP data, the simpliﬁcation of the trade dimension in the cited
papers allows for a more detailed modeling of the effect of speciﬁc policies, such as taxes on
proﬁts of foreign owned ﬁrms, as well as the transition path as countries open up to MP.
Finally, our model is well suited to analyze the impact of globalization (and MP in par-
ticular) on within-country income distribution. By distinguishing between innovation and
production activities, we make contact with a body of theory that emphasizes the effect of
offshoring on the set of activities done within a country and on real wages (e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson (1999); and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). By considering the impact of
China’s integration into world markets in our counterfactuals, our paper also makes contact
with an empirical literature that has documented the depressing effect of Chinese manufac-
turing exports on the employment and wages of developed country manufacturing workers
(e.g. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2012)).
Before proceeding, one conceptual issue is worth noting. In this paper we focus on multi-
nationalproductionasthevehicle throughwhichinternationalspecializationtakesplace, but
there are alternative arrangements, such as the licensing of technology and other contractual
relationships that do not involve ownership (outsourcing). Our model is consistent with all
of these mechanisms, but because there is little data on arm’s length offshoring we can only
measure the offshoring done within multinationals. There is a possibility that relying on
only MP data might create a distorted view of international specialization, but our focus on
a sample of similarly developed countries reduces this concern (see e.g. Antras (2003)).5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our analytical framework
and characterizes its properties. Sections 3 and 4 provide empirical estimates and calibrate
the model. Section 5 assesses its quantitative implications regarding the effect of MP on
welfare and the location of innovation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a world economy comprised of i = 1,..., N countries; one factor of production,
labor; and a continuum of goods indexed by ω 2 Ω. Labor is inelastically supplied and
immobile across countries. Let Li and wi denote the total endowment of labor and the wage
in country i, respectively. In each country i, there is a representative agent with Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function with elasticity of substitution σ > 1. The
5When we introduce China to our quantitative exercises, we do not calibrate to MP ﬂows.
6associated price index is given by
Pi =
￿Z
ω2Ω
pi(ω)1￿σdω
￿ 1
1￿σ
, (1)
where pi(ω) is the price of good ω in country i.
Each good ω is potentially produced by a single ﬁrm under monopolistic competition.
Firms can produce anywhere in the world with varying productivity levels as speciﬁed be-
low. To the extent possible, we use index i to denote the ﬁrm’s country of origin (the source
of the idea), index l to denote the location of production, and index n to denote the country
where the ﬁrm sells its product. Firms that export from l to country n incur a marketing
ﬁxed cost in units of labor in the destination country, wnFn, and an iceberg transportation
cost τln ￿ 1 with τnn = 1. Firms originated in country i that produce in country l incur a
productivity loss that we model as iceberg bilateral MP costs, γil ￿ 1, with γll = 1. These
costs are meant to capture various impediments that multinationals face when operating in
a different economic, legal or social environment, as well as the various costs of technology
transfer incurred by multinationals in different production locations.6
A ﬁrm from origin i can serve destination n by (i) producing in i and exporting to country
n, by (ii) opening an afﬁliate in country l 6= i,n and exporting from there to country n,
or by (iii) opening an afﬁliate in n and selling the good domestically. Firms use constant
returns to scale technologies, with the marginal product of labor being ﬁrm and location
speciﬁc. Formally, a ﬁrm is characterized by a productivity vector z = (z1,z2,...,zN), where
zl determines the ﬁrm’s productivity if it decides to produce in country l. These productivity
vectors are allowed to vary across ﬁrms, leading ﬁrms to make different choices regarding
their production locations.
Letting ξiln ￿ γilwlτln, the above assumptions imply that the unit cost of a ﬁrm from i
producing in location l to serve market n is Ciln ￿ ξiln/zl. Note that all heterogeneity across
ﬁrms isassociated with differencesin theproductivity vector z, while the tradeand MP costs,
fτlng and fγilg, as well as wages (and hence ξiln), are common across ﬁrms.
We think of innovation as the process of creating ﬁrms, and assume that doing so requires
f e
i units of labor. If Le
i units of labor are allocated to the innovation sector in country i, then
the measure of ﬁrms in that country is Mi = Le
i/f e
i . We consider two opposite cases regard-
ing worker mobility between the innovation and production sectors: no mobility and perfect
mobility. With no mobility, the supply of labor to both the innovation and production sectors
6See Kokko (1992), chapter 3, for a review of the ﬁndings of the literature measuring the costs of technology
transfer to foreign afﬁliate ﬁrms.
7is perfectly inelastic.7 Since the measure of ﬁrms in this case is pinned down by the exoge-
nous supply of labor to the innovation sector, we refer to this case as “exogenous entry.” With
perfect mobility, the measure of ﬁrms is determined by the condition that workers optimally
choose where to work. We refer to this case as “endogenous entry.” In the theoretical analy-
sis we restrict ourselves to the simple scenario in which workers are perfectly homogenous,
implying the equalization of the wage in innovation and production. In the quantitative
analysis we extend the model to allow for heterogeneity among workers, as in a Roy model
– this model is discussed further in Section 5 and developed formally in Appendix B.
2.1 Firm Optimization
In this environment, ﬁrms face a simple optimization problem. First, for each market n, a
ﬁrm decides which is the cheapest location from where to serve that market. Second, the
ﬁrm decides which price to charge. Given our assumption on preferences, this choice leads
to a mark-up of e σ ￿ σ/(σ ￿ 1) over marginal cost, so that the price is
pin = e σmin
l
Ciln . (2)
In Figure 3, we summarize how the price charged by a ﬁrm is determined by factors that
are ﬁrm speciﬁc, i.e. the ﬁrm’s productivity vector z, and by factors which depend on the
country of origin, location of production, and ﬁnal sales.
Third, the ﬁrm calculates the associated proﬁts. If those proﬁts are higher than the ﬁxed
marketing cost then the ﬁrm chooses to serve the market. Letting Xn be total expenditure in
country n, the maximum unit cost under which variable proﬁts in market n are enough to
cover the ﬁxed cost wnFn is deﬁned by
c￿
n ￿
￿
σwnFn
Xn
￿1/(1￿σ) Pn
e σ
. (3)
2.2 Aggregation
Although the problem for each ﬁrm is simple, our goal is to obtain analytic expressions for
the aggregate variables that we can relate to the data while retaining key features of previous
theories of international trade. To achieve this purpose, we consider a multivariate extension
of the univariate Pareto distribution used in the Chaney (2008) version of Melitz (2003).
7In fact, in our model there are three activities: production, marketing and entry. We always assume that
there is perfect mobility between production and marketing and refer to "production workers" as those working
in either production or marketing.
8Figure 3: Firm Pricing
Note: Innovation is done in country i at cost wif e
i , production is done in country l at unit cost γilwl/zl, and
consumption is done in country n at price ˜ σγilwlτln/zl.
We assume that the productivity vector of ﬁrms in country i is randomly drawn from the
multivariate distribution given by
Pr(Z1 ￿ z1,...,ZN ￿ zN) = Gi(z1,...,zN) = 1￿
 
N
∑
l=1
h
Tilz￿θ
l
i 1
1￿ρ
!1￿ρ
, (4)
with support zl ￿ e T1/θ
i for all l, where e Ti ￿
h
∑l T
1/(1￿ρ)
il
i1￿ρ
, ρ 2 [0,1), and θ > max(1,σ ￿
1).8 Several comments are in order regarding the properties of this distribution. First,
the marginal distributions have conditional distributions that are Pareto. In particular, for
zl ￿ a > e T1/θ
i we have Pr(Zl ￿ zl j Zl ￿ a) = (zl/a)￿θ. Second, if ρ ! 1 the elements
of (Z1,Z2,...,ZN) are perfectly correlated. Finally, the case with ρ = 0 is equivalent to sim-
ply having the production location l chosen randomly with probabilities Til/e Ti among all
possible locations l = 1,..., N, and the productivity Zl drawn from the Pareto distribution
8A more detailed discussion on the properties of the distribution is provided in the Appendix. This dis-
tribution can be seen as a reformulation of the Archimedean copula of Pareto distributions. Speciﬁcally, the
Archimedean copula 4.2.2 in Nielsen (2006) leads to the same function for the distribution as (4) in the two-
dimensional case if z1 and z2 are each distributed Pareto, except that the support would be implicitly deﬁned
by (T1z￿θ
1 )
1
1￿ρ + (T2z￿θ
2 )
1
1￿ρ ￿ 1. This distribution cannot be directly extended to N ￿ 3 because the copula is
not strict (see Nielsen (2006)). Instead, we modify the support of the distribution to make it an N-box deﬁned
by zl ￿ e T1/θ
i for all l.
9Figure 4: Simulated draws from multivariate Pareto with ρ = 0.1 (left panel) ρ = 0.9 (right
panel)
Note: Simulation for 10,000 draws with distribution speciﬁed with N = 2, T1 = T2 = 2ρ￿1,
θ = 7.2.
1￿ e Tiz￿θ
l with zl ￿ e T1/θ
i . Figure 4 illustrates how the distribution depends on the value of ρ.
For the reminder of the paper, we make the following assumption.
A 1 Til = Te
i T
p
l .
This assumption implies that e Ti =
￿
∑l
￿
T
p
l
￿1/(1￿ρ)￿1/(1￿ρ)
Te
i , so that we can think of
Te
i as a measure of the quality of ideas in country i, or productivity in innovation. In turn,
T
p
l determines country l’s productivity in production.9 We will continue to write Til rather
than Te
i T
p
l for notational convenience. Note that Te
i and f e
i will have equivalent effects on all
relevant equilibrium variables and, thus, we henceforth assume that f e
i = f e for all i.
To guarantee that for all pairs fi,ng there are ﬁrms from i that will decide not to serve
market n, weassumethattheparametersofthemodel(e.g., marketingcosts)aresuchthatthe
level of c￿
n is low enough. Formally, we make the following assumption, which we maintain
throughout the rest of the paper.
A 2 ξiln > e T1/θ
i c￿
n, for all i,l,n.
The multivariate Pareto distribution together with this assumption allows us to charac-
terize several important objects in the model, starting from the probability that a ﬁrm serves
a particular destination from a certain location at some unit cost c, and the (conditional)
probability that ﬁrms from i serving market n decide to do so from production location l.
9This setup easily allows for splitting countries without affecting the equilibrium. For example, we could
split country l into two countries, l1 and l2, with Te
lj = Te
l and
￿
T
p
lj
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/Llj =
￿
T
p
l
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/Ll for j = 1,2.
One can show that if there are no costs to trade and MP between l1 and l2 then the equilibrium is not affected
by the split (the proof is available upon request).
10Lemma 1 Let Ψin ￿
￿
∑k
￿
Tikξ￿θ
ikn
￿ 1
1￿ρ
￿1￿ρ
and ψiln ￿
￿
Tilξ￿θ
iln/Ψin
￿ 1
1￿ρ . The (unconditional)
probability that a ﬁrm from i will serve market n from l at cost c, for c ￿ c￿
n, is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn = c
￿
= ψilnΨinθcθ￿1, (5)
while the (conditional) probability that ﬁrms from i serving market n will choose location l for pro-
duction is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l j min
k
Cikn ￿ c￿
n
￿
= ψiln. (6)
The formal proof of this result, as well as the rest of the results of the paper, are given in
Appendix B. We now use this Lemma to analyze the model’s implications for aggregate trade
and MP ﬂows. Let Mi denote the measure of ﬁrms in country i, Miln denote the measure
of ﬁrms from i that serve market n from location l, and Xiln denote the total value of the
associated sales. Using the pricing rule in (2) and the cut-off rule in (3), we can compute Xiln
by integrating ﬁrm sales using the density in (5) to obtain
Xiln = ψilnλE
inXn , (7)
where
λE
in ￿ ∑l Xiln
Xn
=
MiΨin
∑k MkΨkn
, (8)
is the share of total expenditures in country n that are devoted to goods produced by ﬁrms
from i (irrespective of where they are produced). The measure of ﬁrms behind these sales is
Miln =
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
Xiln
wnFn
. (9)
Aggregate ﬂows Xiln can be used to construct trade and MP shares. In particular, trade
shares are given by expenditure shares across production locations, λT
ln ￿ ∑i Xiln/∑i,k Xikn,
while MP shares are given by production shares across ﬁrms from different origins, λM
il ￿
∑n Xiln/∑j,n Xjln. Letting Yl ￿ ∑i,n Xiln denote the value of all goods produced in country
l (output), recalling that Xn ￿ ∑i,l Xiln is total expenditure by consumers in country n, and
using expression (7), trade and MP shares can be written more succinctly as
λT
ln = ∑
i
Xiln
Xn
= ∑
i
ψilnλE
in, (10)
11and
λM
il = ∑
n
Xiln
Yl
=
∑n ψilnλE
inXn
Yl
. (11)
Let Πiln denote aggregate proﬁts associated with sales Xiln, net of ﬁxed marketing costs,
but gross of entry costs. Given Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, variable proﬁts associated with Xiln
are Xiln/σ. The total ﬁxed marketing costs paid by these ﬁrms are wnFnMiln. Using these
two expressions and (9), we obtain
Πiln = ηXiln, (12)
where η ￿ 1/(θ˜ σ). Therefore, total proﬁts made in country l are a constant share of output
in country l, i.e. ∑i,n Πiln = ηYl.
2.3 Equilibrium
We start by considering the labor market clearing condition. Let L
p
i denote the amount of
labor devoted to production and marketing in country i. The result in (9) implies that a
share θ￿σ+1
σθ of output produced in any country is used to pay for the marketing of that
output, hence a share 1 ￿ η ￿ θ￿σ+1
σθ of output is left to pay for production labor. We then
have
L
p
i =
￿
1￿ η ￿
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
￿
Yi
wi
+∑
j,l
MjliFi.
Noting that Le
i = Mif e, Yi = ∑n λT
inXn, and using (9), the labor market clearing condition for
workers in production and marketing in country n is then
￿
1￿ η ￿
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
￿
∑
n
λT
inXn +
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
Xi = wi(Li ￿ Mif e). (13)
Next, we characterize the current account balance condition.10 For country i, total expen-
diture is Xi while total income equals the sum of three terms: (i) the net value of sales, which
equalstotalsales, Yi, minusthecostofmarketinggoodsproducedincountry i, ∑j,n MjinwnFn;
(ii) wages paid to workers engaged in marketing for sales in country i, ∑j,l MjliwiFi; (iii) net
proﬁts, which are equal to proﬁts made by domestic ﬁrms, ∑l,n Πiln, minus proﬁts made
domestically by foreign ﬁrms, ∑j,n Πjin. Thus, we can write the current account balance con-
10In this Section we impose current account balance, whereas in the quantitative section we allow for exoge-
nous current account imbalances.
12dition as
Xi = Yi ￿∑
j,n
MjinwnFn +∑
j,l
MjliwiFi +∑
l,n
Πiln ￿∑
j,n
Πjin.
Using (7), (12), and (13) we can rewrite this condition as
Xi = wi(Li ￿ Mif e) + η∑
n
λE
inXn. (14)
Finally, we turn to the zero-proﬁt condition. Total proﬁts earned by ﬁrms created in i
are ∑l,n Πiln while the total cost of creating those ﬁrms is we
iLe
i, where we
i is the wage paid
to workers in the innovation sector. Using (12) and noting that Le
i = Mif e, the zero-proﬁt
condition is
η∑
n
λE
inXn = Miwe
i f e. (15)
Under exogenous entry, the labor supply to the production sector is exogenous, hence
equations (13) and (14) constitute a system of 2N equations that can be used to solve for
the equilibrium levels of X and w (up to a constant determined by the numeraire) given
Mi = Le
i/f e (where Le
i isexogenous). Thewageintheinnovationsector, we
i, isrecoveredfrom
(15). Under endogenous entry, perfect labor mobility between production and innovation
implies that we
i must be equal to wi.11 Equations (13), (14) and (15) with we
i replaced by wi
constitute a system of 3N equations to solve for the equilibrium levels of X, M, and w (up to
a constant determined by the numeraire).
A key concept in the rest of the paper is the share of income earned in the innovation
sector (or simply the innovation share), ri ￿ we
iLe
i/
￿
we
iLe
i + wiL
p
i
￿
, which is also equal to
ri = ∑l,n Πiln/Xi. The equilibrium conditions above imply that
ri ￿ η =
1
e σ
￿
Xi ￿Yi
Xi
￿
. (16)
Therefore, the innovation share is directly related to the trade deﬁcit, Xi ￿ Yi. In fact, in the
two extreme cases of inﬁnite MP or inﬁnite trade costs, we must have Xi = Yi and, thus,
ri = η. The ﬁrst case is discussed in more detail below.
2.4 Special Cases
In this subsection, we explore a number of special cases of the model under endogenous
entry that we can characterize analytically. These cases illustrate how, in the presence of
11We assume throughout the paper that the equilibrium with endogenous entry is interior, so that 0 < L
p
i <
Li.
13MP, comparative advantage and home market effects (HME) determine whether countries
specialize in innovation or production. They also shed light on the basic forces behind the
results of our quantitative analysis in Section 5.
2.4.1 Inﬁnite MP costs - a world without MP
It is instructive to consider the case in which MP costs are inﬁnite, i.e., γil ! ∞ for all i 6= l.
This restriction implies that expenditure shares are equal to trade shares, λE
in = λT
in, and that
λT
in =
MiTii (wiτin)
￿θ
∑k MkTkk (wkτkn)
￿θ, (17)
which is the same expression as in the Melitz/Chaney model. The equilibrium conditions
under endogenous entry then imply that
Mi = e Mi ￿ ηLi/f e, (18)
so that the share of labor devoted to innovation is independent of trade costs and entry
costs, and is equal to η in all countries. This is consistent with the results in the version of the
Melitz model presented in Arkolakis et al. (2008), where entry is endogenous but not affected
by trade costs.12
2.4.2 A frictionless world - the role of comparative advantage
Wenowdiscusstheroleofcomparativeadvantageininnovationversusproduction. Tomake
the analysis tractable, we focus on the case of a frictionless world, i.e., τln = 1 and γil = 1,
for all i,l,n. Let Ai ￿
￿
T
p
i
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/Li and δi ￿ LiTe
i /∑k LkTe
k. Ai is an index for a country’s
productivity in production and δi is a measure of relative size. The equilibrium conditions
for this case lead to the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a frictionless world under endogenous entry. Assume that, for all i,
1￿ (1￿ η)e σ <
Ai/
￿
Te
i
￿θ/(1￿ρ)+1
∑k δkAk/
￿
Te
k
￿θ/(1￿ρ)+1 < 1+ ηe σ. (19)
12An equivalent result is derived by Eaton and Kortum (2001) in a setting with Bertrand competition.
14The share of labor devoted to innovation in country i is
ri =
Le
i
Li
=
1
e σ
 
1￿
Ai/
￿
Te
i
￿θ/(1￿ρ)+1
∑k δkAk/
￿
Te
k
￿θ/(1￿ρ)+1
!
+ η. (20)
Condition(19) guaranteesthatinnovationsharesin(20) areinterior, i.e. satisfyri 2 (0,1),
so that no country is completely specialized in innovation or production, i.e., Le
i 6= f0, Lig,
for all i.
Proposition 1 illustrates how the different parameters of the model determine whether
a country specializes in innovation or production. It tells us that countries with a relatively
high ratio of productivity in innovation to production (i.e., countries that have a comparative
advantage in innovation) will (partially) specialize in innovation. This high ratio will be
reﬂected in an innovation share higher than the world average, i.e., ri > η. Countries with
comparative advantage in innovation will also have a trade deﬁcit (i.e., Xi > Yi), as can be
seen from equation (16).
2.4.3 A two-country world - the role of home market effects
Under endogenous entry our model exhibits HMEs, according to which the location of inno-
vation and production across countries is affected by country size, as well as trade and MP
costs. To illustrate these effects and study the resulting patterns of innovation and produc-
tion in the simplest way, we consider a world with two countries.
We start with a case where the two countries have different population sizes and study
two extreme cases of frictionless trade and frictionless MP, respectively.
Proposition 2 Consider a two-country world under endogenous entry. Assume that A1 = A2,
Te
1 = Te
2, and L1 > L2.
i) If there are no trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = 1, and MP costs are symmetric, γ12 = γ21 = γ > 1, then
in an interior equilibrium r1 > r2.
ii) If there are no MP costs, γ12 = γ21 = 1, and trade costs are symmetric, τ12 = τ21 = τ > 1, then
in an interior equilibrium r1 < r2.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition shows the existence of a home market effect (HME) in
innovation. Since MP costs are positive but trade is frictionless, it makes sense to innovate
in the country with the larger labor force. The opposite result arises if MP is frictionless
but trade is costly, in which case the large country specializes in production. We refer to
this effect as a quasi-HME, because it runs counter to the logic of the home market effect,
whereby the larger country specializes in the activity with increasing returns, which here is
15innovation. Frictionless MP together with symmetric productivity in innovation imply that
in an interior equilibrium wages must be equalized. But given trade frictions, a more than
proportionate share of production will take place in the larger market.13 It is important to
note here that the quasi-HME turns out to be much weaker than the HME: our numerical
simulations show that in the presence of both trade and MP costs, the large country tends to
specialize in innovation. In particular, the large country specializes in innovation whenever
τ = γ > 1 and only specializes in production if γ is much smaller than τ.
HMEs and quasi-HME also arise due to differences in MP costs or trade costs, even if
population sizes are the same. The following proposition illustrates these two effects.
Proposition 3 Consider a two-country world under endogenous entry. Assume that A1 = A2,
Te
1 = Te
2, and L1 = L2. Then
i) If there are no trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = 1, and MP costs satisfy γ12 < γ21, then in an interior
equilibrium we have r1 > r2.
ii) If there are no MP costs, γ12 = γ21 = 1, and trade costs satisfy τ12 < τ21, then in an interior
equilibrium we have r1 < r2.
The ﬁrst result is a reﬂection of a standard HME: all else equal, it is more proﬁtable to
innovate in the country with higher inward MP costs. The second result is again a reﬂection
of an quasi-HME. As above, wages are equalized in an interior equilibrium with frictionless
MP and Te
1 = Te
2. This implies that the country with higher inward trade costs attracts more
production, pushing innovation to the country with lower inward trade costs.
The results of this section reveal how specialization in innovation or production results
from the pattern of comparative advantage and home market effects. Comparative advan-
tage is driven by differences in technological parameters such as Te
i and T
p
l , while home-
market effects are driven by the differences in country size combined with the frictions of
moving ideas and goods. In fact, as we will argue in the calibration section below, vari-
ous combinations of the technological parameters and the trade and MP frictions are able to
generate the exact same specialization patterns and trade and MP ﬂows. In this sense, com-
parative advantage and home market effects are substitutes when it comes to matching the
patterns of specialization of trade and MP ﬂows that we observe in the data.
13The forces leading to quasi-HME are clearly not speciﬁc to our model. To see this, recall that the standard
model used to illustrate the home-market effect has a differentiated-good sector modeled as in Krugman (1980),
and a homogeneous-good sector where production takes place with constant returns to scale and perfect com-
petition. Consider a variation of this model where instead of the homogeneous-good sector we have a sector
with a continuum of goods modeled as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) – call the two sectors the Krugman and the
EK sectors, respectively. One can show that if trade costs are zero for the Krugman sector and positive for the
EK sector then, ceteris paribus, the large country partially specializes in the EK sector – a quasi-HME (see the
online appendix).
162.5 Welfare Implications
Wenowturntothemodel’simplicationsforhowtradeandMPaffectwelfareineachcountry.
We are interested both in a country’s overall welfare, as measured by aggregate real income,
as well as real wages of workers in innovation and production.
2.5.1 Gains from Trade and MP
We start by considering the overall gains from openness, deﬁned as the change in aggregate
real income as we move from a counterfactual equilibrium with no trade and no MP to the
observed equilibrium. The gains from openness as a function of equilibrium trade and MP
ﬂows (given parameters θ, ρ, σ) are
GOn =
2
4
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ
3
5
| {z }
Direct Effect
2
4χ
 
1
e σ + 1
σ ￿ η
1
e σ
Yn
Xn + 1
σ ￿ η
!1+1
θ
θ￿σ+1
(σ￿1)
+ (1￿ χ)
￿
1+ θ ￿
Yn
Xn
￿1/θ
3
5
| {z }
Indirect Effect
,
(21)
where χ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 under exogenous entry and 0 under
endogenous entry (see Appendix B.) With no MP, we can show that the gains from openness
(i.e., the gains from trade in this case) are given by GOn =
￿
λT
nn
￿￿1/θ
, as in Eaton and
Kortum (2002), and Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). With MP, the gains
from openness are composed of a direct and an indirect effect, which we discuss in turn.
The understand the direct effect, consider ﬁrst the simple case in which ρ = 0, under
which the direct effect collapses to (Xnnn/Xn)
￿1/θ. The term Xnnn/Xn is an inverse measure
of the degree of openness to trade and MP of country n. As one would expect, this measure
implies more openness than the typical measure of trade openness, since Xnnn/Xn < λT
nn =
∑i Xinn/Xn. Turning to the case with ρ > 0, note that
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ
=
￿
∑l Xnln
∑i,l Xiln
￿￿1
θ ￿
Xnnn
∑l Xnln
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ
.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures the gains for country n from being able to
consume goods produced with foreign technologies (independently of where production
takes place), while the second term captures the gains for country n from being able to use
its own technologies abroad and import the goods back for domestic consumption. Given
the equilibrium ﬂows Xiln, ρ > 0 leads to lower gains than ρ = 0 since, if productivity draws
are correlated, the gains associated with the second term are not as important.
17The indirect effect captures the gains or losses triggered by the net inward or outward
ﬂow of proﬁts due to MP. Countries with net outward MP ﬂows have a net inward ﬂow of
proﬁts and Xn/Yn > 1, implying a positive indirect effect; the opposite occurs in countries
with net inward MP ﬂows. The way in which these welfare effects materialize depends on
whether we assume exogenous or endogenous entry. Under exogenous entry, a net inﬂow
of proﬁts from MP implies a higher total income and a lower price index thanks to the effect
of higher expenditures on the variety of goods available for domestic consumption. Under
endogenous entry, the net inﬂow of proﬁts is associated with higher entry (i.e., higher Mn),
which increases welfare by inducing a better selection of varieties in the domestic market.
It is useful to compare our result for gains from openness with those in the perfectly
competitive setting of Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013). Although these authors did
not derive it explicitly, one can show that their model leads to an expression for the gains
from openness equal to the direct effect in (21).14 Thus, given trade and MP ﬂows, the
difference between the two models is captured entirely by the indirect effect. We can then
conclude that our monopolistic competition setup implies larger gains from openness than
the perfect competition model of Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) for countries with a
net outﬂow of MP, while the opposite is true for countries with a net inﬂow of MP.
In addition to the gains from openness, we are also interested in the separate welfare
effects of trade and MP. As in Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), the gains from trade,
GT, are deﬁned as the ratio of real income (Xi/Pi) between the calibrated equilibrium and a
counterfactual equilibrium where there is no trade, computed by letting τln ! ∞ for l 6= n.
Analogously, the gains from MP, GMP, are deﬁned as the ratio of real income between the
calibrated equilibrium and a counterfactual equilibrium with no MP, computed by letting
γil ! ∞ for i 6= l.
2.5.2 Multinational Production and Real Wages
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a widespread concern that globalization of pro-
duction may have a detrimental effect on workers in rich countries. In this subsection we
use our model to explore this possibility. In particular, we study the effect of a decline in
outward MP costs on the real wage in a country that has a relative abundance of innovation
labor and or a high productivity in innovation (under exogenous entry), or a comparative
advantage in innovation (under endogenous entry). To make the analysis tractable, we focus
on the comparative statics of moving from a situation with frictionless trade but no MP to a
14In Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) the parameters θ and ρ play analogous roles as in our model,
except that in their case those parameters are associated with a multivariate Frechet distribution rather than a
multivariate Pareto distribution.
18situation with both frictionless trade and MP.
For the case of exogenous entry, we assume that ρ ! 1. This assumption makes it more
likely that MP will hurt workers in rich countries, since the gains from MP arising from
differencesinﬁrmproductivityacrosscountriesarenotpresentinthiscase. Byrichcountries,
in this context, we mean countries that have a relative abundance of high-productivity ﬁrms,
i.e., a relatively high ratio mi ￿ Te
i Le
i/L
p
i , whereas productivity in production is assumed to
be the same across countries, e Ai ￿
￿
T
p
i
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/L
p
i = e A for all i.
Proposition 4 Consider a world under exogenous entry. Assume that e Ai = e A and Te
i = Te for all
i, that ρ ! 1, and that mj = ˆ m, for all j 6= i, and mi = ˆ m + ε, for ε small enough. Consider a switch
from frictionless trade but no MP to frictionless trade and MP. This switch
i) increases real production wages iff σ < ¯ θ ￿
(1+θ)
2
1+θ+θ2,
ii) increases real wages for innovation workers and aggregate real income, for any value of σ.
By giving ﬁrms the ability to locate production in low-wage countries, MP exerts a down-
ward pressure on production wages in rich countries. The same forces lead to an increase in
innovation wages and total income, and this increases the variety of goods available for con-
sumption and decreases the price index. If the elasticity of substitution is low enough, this
increase in variety will have a large downward effect on the price index, which more than
compensates for the decrease in nominal wages, allowing real production wages to increase.
Under endogenous entry, labor can be reallocated to innovation and this leads to a more
beneﬁcial effect of MP on real wages.
Proposition 5 Consider the case of endogenous entry and assume that condition (19) holds, so that
the equilibrium in a frictionless world is an interior equilibrium. Consider a switch from frictionless
trade but no MP to both frictionless trade and MP. This switch increases real wages and real income.
Comparing Propositions 4 and 5 reveals that the effect of a decline in MP costs critically
depends on whether entry is exogenous or endogenous. With endogenous entry, MP open-
ness induces higher demand for labor in the innovation sector in the rich country. This leads
to a contraction in employment in the production sector, which results in an improvement in
the country’s terms of trade (i.e., the relative wage) and an increase in the real wage.
2.5.3 Can Countries Lose from MP?
Unfortunately, the strong positive result in Proposition 5 depends on the assumption that
trade is frictionless and that all barriers to MP are eliminated. In fact, in our calibrated ex-
amples in Section 5 we ﬁnd that some countries (e.g., Greece) lose from MP, i.e. GMP < 1.
19To understand this possibility, it is useful to start by discussing a simpler result, namely that
a country can lose from unilateral MP liberalization (i.e., a decline in inward MP costs). Con-
sider a perfectly symmetric two-country world with frictionless trade. In this context, it can
be shown that unilateral MP liberalization leads to a decline in innovation and welfare in the
liberalizing country (see the online appendix). This result resonates with the well-known re-
sult of Venables (1987) that unilateral liberalization can decrease welfare in a Krugman (1980)
model with a homogeneous-good sector, but his mechanism is different. The welfare effect in
Venables (1987) is caused by the delocation of ﬁrms away from the liberalizing country and
the resulting increase of its differentiated-goods price index. In contrast, in our model the
price index falls in the liberalizing country, but its welfare declines because of a deterioration
in its terms of trade caused by the expansion of employment in the production sector.
Can a country lose from multilateral MP liberalization? Resorting to numerical examples
inthesimplecaseoftwocountriesweﬁndthatthisisindeedpossible.15 Thelogicisasabove:
if MP liberalization triggers home market effects that push innovation in country i below its
no-MP level, i.e. ri < η, the deterioration of country i0s terms of trade may dominate the
direct MP gains from the use of foreign ideas, implying loses from MP, GMPi < 1.16
The previous discussion may suggest the possibility that a country loses from openness,
GOi < 1. But our numerical simulations for two countries never lead to such a result: even if
openness leads to a decline in innovation below its autarky value, i.e. ri < η, the direct gains
from openness always outweigh the indirect loses through a decline in innovation. The key
insight here is that trade and MP are substitutes in the sense that, if one of these channels is
present, then adding the other channel leads to small additional direct gains (see Ramondo
and Rodríguez-Clare (2013)) which may not be enough to compensate for the loses arising
from the fall in innovation.
3 Empirical Estimates
In this Section, we use data on production, trade, and multinational sales to provide empir-
ical estimates that are informative for the main two parameters of our theory that we need
to calibrate, θ and ρ. Loosely speaking, the value of θ governs the substitutability across
products of heterogeneous ﬁrms from a given origin, while the value of ρ governs the sub-
stitutability across different production locations for a given ﬁrm. To infer the value of these
15For the numerical example we set θ,σ and ρ as calibrated in Section 4, together with τ12 = τ21 = 3 and
γ12 = 3 and γ21 = 4.
16A numerical example as in the previous footnote reveals that these results extend to unilateral and multi-
lateral trade liberalization, so that we can have GTi < 1 for some countries if home-market effects push ri below
η.
20parameters, we consider the estimates of the trade elasticity from two distinct gravity equa-
tions.
The ﬁrst gravity equation is deﬁned over Xiln, the sales volumes of the set of ﬁrms that
originate in country i, produce in country l, and sell in country n. Because this gravity
equation is deﬁned over trade ﬂows conducted by ﬁrms that originate from a single i, we
refer to this equation as “restricted gravity.” The second gravity equation is deﬁned over
Xln ￿ ∑i Xiln, the sales to n from all ﬁrms operating in country l. Because this gravity equa-
tion is deﬁned over trade ﬂows by ﬁrms from all countries, we refer to this equation as
“unrestricted gravity.”
3.1 Restricted Gravity
Toestimatetherestrictedgravityequation, weuseexpression(7)–seealso(B.4)intheAppendix–
and take logarithms to obtain
lnXiln = αr
il + µr
in ￿
θ
1￿ ρ
lnτln, (22)
where αr
il and µr
in are ﬁxed effects.17 Equation (22) relates sales of ﬁrms from i producing in l
and selling to n to a production-location and a destination ﬁxed effect as well as to the trade
friction between l and n, τln, with an elasticity of ￿θ/(1￿ ρ).
A difﬁculty of operationalizing (22) is that we must have an accurate measure of the
relative size of trade frictions between countries l and n. The use of proxies for τln, such
as distance or shared language, cannot reveal the structural parameters of interest as the
coefﬁcient estimate would conﬂate the trade elasticity with the way in which τln varies with
the proxy.18 We instead rely on a measure of the size of trade costs that is directly related to a
criticalcomponentof τln, whichistheasymmetrictreatmentacrosslocationsofproductionin
the tariffs applied to goods. Speciﬁcally, we operationalize the “restricted” gravity equation
17Given i, the ﬁxed effect captured by αr
il varies by location of production and corresponds (in the model) to
αr
il = ln
￿
Mi
h
Te
i T
p
l (wlγil)￿θ
i 1
1￿ρ
￿
, while the ﬁxed effect captured by µr
in varies by country of destination and
corresponds (in the model) to µr
in = ln
￿
XnΨ
￿ρ
1￿ρ
in /∑k MkΨkn
￿
.
18This feature of the gravity model of trade led Eaton and Kortum (2002), Donaldson (2012), and Simonovska
and Waugh (2009) to use price gaps of homogeneous goods between locations to back out measures of τln. In
our monopolistically competitive model we cannot use these price variations for that same purpose so we need
to resort to different ways of measuring τln.
21by parameterizing trade costs so that
lnXiln = αr
l + µr
n + βr ln(1+ tln) +∑
k
δr
k[1jdln 2 dk] + ΘrHln + εln, (23)
where tln is the simple average tariff applied by n on goods from l, [1jdln 2 dk] is an indica-
tor variable for distance between n and l –whose marginal effect on trade costs is given by
δr
k–, and Hln is a vector of standard gravity controls, including a shared language, a shared
border, and an indicator variable, called self, that is equal to one if l = n. To the extent that
constructed measures of tln accurately capture variation in asymmetric trade frictions be-
tween countries, the coefﬁcient estimate ˆ β
r
has the structural interpretation of the parameter
ratio θ/(1 ￿ ρ). The coefﬁcients on the other, more standard, proxies for trade costs such as
the distance indicator variables, do not have a direct structural interpretation as they are a
mixture of ￿θ/(1￿ ρ) and the effect of the variable on the size of trade costs. Because in our
data there are multiple observations for each production location l and for each destination
country n, we can estimate (23) via ordinary least squares (OLS) with dummy variables.
We use data on the operation of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms across multiple locations con-
structed from the 1999 benchmark survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on the
operations of U.S. multinationals abroad. For each country l, we observe sales of U.S. multi-
nationals in their host country and their exports to the United States, Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and a composite of fourteen European Union countries. We also observe
the domestic sales of U.S. ﬁrms in the United States (net of the sales of foreign afﬁliates in the
UnitedStates)andtheirexportstoeachcountryinthedataset. Detailsabouttheconstruction
of the data can be found in the Data Appendix.
In our sample of the global operations of U.S. multinationals, there are two forms of vari-
ation in tln that identify βr. The ﬁrst type of variation is due to the fact that ﬁrms that open a
local afﬁliate avoid all trade costs (i.e. tnn = 0), while ﬁrms from another country generally
must pay the applied MFN tariff rate. A second source of variation in tln is due to the fact
that some l and n belong to common preferential trade agreements (and so tln = 0), while
others do not (so that exports from l pay country n’s MFN applied tariff rates).19
There are several concerns that arise in using tariff data to estimate the trade elasticity.
First, there is the problem of endogeneity since country pairs for which there is a natural
afﬁnity for trade are more likely to agree to preferential trading arrangements. The standard
gravity controls in (23) proxy for this afﬁnity. To the extent that there are other determinants
of preferential trading agreements that are excluded from (23), the trade elasticity may be
19There is also some variation in constructed tariff measures due to the fact that developed countries extend
Generalized System of Preference tariffs to a number of developing countries.
22biased upward. A second potential problem arises because the model does not suggest an
appropriate way to aggregate tariffs across industries. We have chosen a simple average of
applied tariffs because other aggregation schemes are either ad hoc or have an element of en-
dogeneity to them.20 If tln is seriously mismeasured, our estimate of βr is biased downward.
We include self to control for the variation in tln that is due to unmeasured trade costs, such
as administrative and information frictions, that local production avoids.
3.2 Unrestricted Gravity
The “unrestricted” gravity equation has the same form as the “restricted” gravity equation,
but it is estimated on the bilateral sales of all ﬁrms located in country l selling to country n.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate
lnXln = αu
l + µu
n + βu ln(1+ tln) +∑
k
δu
k[1jdln 2 dk] + ΘuHln + viln. (24)
The coefﬁcient estimate ˆ β
u
does not have a structural interpretation, but it still provides in-
formation on the relative magnitudes of θ and ρ. To see this, recall that if MP is not possible
then all exports are done by local ﬁrms, the correlation of the ﬁrm productivity shocks de-
termined by ρ is irrelevant, and the coefﬁcient on tariffs is equal to θ (see equation 17). In
the data most exports are done by domestic ﬁrms so that Xln disproportionately contains
information on the operations of domestic ﬁrms. This suggests that ˆ β
u
is closer to θ than
ˆ β
r
, which is equal to θ/(1￿ ρ). In summary, the model implies the following restriction on
parameters: ˆ β
r = ￿θ/(1￿ ρ) < ˆ β
u < ￿θ < 0.
We estimate (24) using data on trade volumes of manufacturing industries and domestic
absorption. To ensure comparability between the coefﬁcients, we restrict the sample so that
the country pair coverage in the restricted and unrestricted samples is the same.
3.3 Results
The coefﬁcient estimates for the two OLS regressions are reported in Table 1 (with robust
standard errors in parenthesis). Each column of the Table corresponds to a dependent vari-
able, while the ﬁrst and second rows correspond to the restricted and unrestricted speciﬁ-
cations, respectively. Of most relevance to our analysis are the elasticity estimates for tariff
shown in the ﬁrst column. Note that the underlying data in both speciﬁcations have 317 ob-
servations. The trade elasticity in the restricted regression of 10.9 is our estimate of θ/(1￿ρ).
20We report robustness with an alternative weighting scheme in the online Appendix.
23Distance Dummies Other Gravity Controls
Tariff D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 Self Border Lang. R-sq.
Restricted -10.9 -0.4 -0.4 -1.3 -2.9 -2.7 2.1 0.2 0.7 0.84
(-3.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (0.6) (0.3)
Unrestricted -4.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -1.9 -1.7 3.3 1.0 0.0 0.89
(1.8) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.1)
Table 1: Restricted and Unrestricted Gravity: OLS Estimates
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Distance Dummies Other Gravity Controls
Tariff D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 Self Border Lang. Chi-sq.
Restricted -8.4 -0.4 -1.7 -0.4 -1.6 -1.2 2.2 0.3 -0.2 6006
(2.6) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2)
Unrestricted -5.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -1.7 -1.3 2.8 0.8 -0.2 34975
(1.7) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Table 2: Restricted and Unrestricted Gravity: Poisson PML Estimator
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
The trade elasticity in the unrestricted regression is signiﬁcantly smaller at 4.3, as expected.
Estimating the gravity equations via OLS, we assume that any source of variation in the
error term, εln, is orthogonal to the independent variables. This is a strong assumption,
but one that is routinely maintained in gravity equation estimation. However, if εln is het-
eroscedastic, OLS estimates may be biased (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). To study the
effect of this bias, we re-estimate both gravity models using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-
likelihood (PML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and report the coefﬁcient
estimates in Table 2. The results are somewhat affected by the alternative estimation proce-
dure, with the trade elasticity slightly smaller for the restricted gravity case and somewhat
larger for the unrestricted case. These Poisson estimates provide us with an alternative para-
meter choice to our baseline calibration.
The coefﬁcient estimates of 4.3 and 5.4 obtained from the unrestricted gravity estima-
tion are in the ballpark of estimates of the trade elasticity obtained by the trade literature.
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) reports that estimates of the trade elasticity using price
differentials, or tariffs, across countries range from ﬁve to ten. More recent estimates using
tariffs, such as Romalis (2007) and Caliendo and Parro (2010), fall within the same range. Si-
monovska and Waugh (2009), using price differentials, and a reﬁnement of the methodology
of Eaton and Kortum (2002), bring these estimates closer to 4.
244 Calibration
We restrict our analysis to 18 OECD countries for which we have good data for both trade
and MP.21 We use STAN data on manufacturing trade ﬂows from country l to country n as
the empirical counterpart of bilateral trade in the model, and STAN production data minus
aggregate exports to compute home sales. Using this information, we construct the N ￿ N
matrix of trade shares, λT
ln, and the N ￿ 1 vector of aggregate expenditures, Xn. In addition,
we use UNCTAD data on the gross value of production for multinational afﬁliates from
country i in country l to construct the empirical counterpart of bilateral MP ﬂows and obtain
an N ￿ N matrix of production shares, λM
il .22 Finally, we measure the N ￿ 1 vector of labor
endowments, Li, as equipped labor, from Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005), adjusted by
the share of employment in the manufacturing sector, from UNIDO; this is also the variable
we refer to as country size. All the data refer to an average over 1996-2001.
We set the value of θ/(1￿ ρ) = 10.9 to match the restricted gravity elasticity estimated
above in Table 1. To determine the exact levels of θ and ρ, we use the predictions of the model
regarding the unrestricted gravity regression coefﬁcient. Computing that same elasticity in
the model, however, requires to calculate the model’s equilibrium and generate a data set of
trade ﬂows and trade costs, a procedure that we describe below. For θ = 4 and ρ = 0.63,
which satisfy θ/(1￿ ρ) = 10.9, the model predicts an OLS unrestricted trade elasticity of
￿4.3. As an alternative calibration, we match the Poisson PML estimators: the coefﬁcients
of 8.3 and 5.4, for restricted and unrestricted gravity, respectively. This yields θ = 4.95 and
ρ = 0.40.
We also need a value for the parameter σ, which determines the markup in the model,
e σ. Estimates for the average mark-up for manufacturing across OECD countries by Martins,
Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) are around 20 percent, while estimates by Domowitz, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988) for the U.S. manufacturing sector bring this number closer to 37 percent.
Since we need to satisfy the restriction θ > σ ￿1, we set σ = 4, which leads to markups of 33
percent, closer to the high end of the empirical estimates.23
21The sample of countries is the same as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare
(2013). It includes Australia, Austria, Benelux (Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands aggregated as one
country), Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States.
22Since our quantitative analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector, while the MP data from UNCTAD
includes all MP ﬂows, we rely on the following approximation. We observe that, for the United States, MP
ﬂows in manufacturing account for approximately one half of overall MP ﬂows, while manufacturing gross
output is approximately one half of overall GDP. Thus, we take overall manufacturing MP ﬂows divided by
GDP (taken from the World Development Indicators) as an approximation of manufacturing MP ﬂows as a
share of gross production in manufacturing.
23Given our calibration, the proﬁt share, η = 1/(˜ σθ), is 18.75% (15.15% for θ = 4.95). The proﬁt share equals
25The calibration of the rest of the parameters proceeds in three steps. The ﬁrst step of the
calibration algorithm uses our constructed trade and MP shares as well as data on Li and Xi
together with the equilibrium conditions of the model with endogenous entry to construct
output, Yi, wages, wi, innovation shares, ri, and implied current account deﬁcits, which we
label as ∆i. We need to allow for current account deﬁcits in order for the model to match the
data. Table 3 presents the data used and the results in this step of the calibration.
Given the aggregate variables calculated in the ﬁrst step and the values for σ and θ/(1 ￿
ρ), the second step of the algorithm searches over two matrices of parameters, e γil ￿ T￿1/θ
il γil
and τln, to exactly match the data on trade and MP shares. The fact that T￿1/θ
il and γil matter
throughtheirproductimpliesthatourprocedureisnotabletoseparatelyidentifytechnology
parameters from MP costs, hence we cannot determine whether it is comparative advantage
or home market effects that determine the innovation patterns across countries. Intuitively, a
high observed innovation rate ri could be explained by the model either as a consequence of
a high Te
i relative to T
p
i /L
1￿ρ
i (as in Proposition 1), or favorable size and trade/MP costs (as
in Propositions 2 and 3). To proceed, we impose Te
i = 1 and T
p
i = (Li)
1￿ρ for all i. Together
with γll = τll = 1 for all l, this assumption implies that e γll = L
￿(1￿ρ)/θ
l , which affects the
level of the calibrated e γil and τln. However, the implied trilateral ﬂows (Xiln) and the results
of the counterfactual exercises performed with the calibrated model for a percentage change
in parameters γil and τln, are not affected by this assumption, as we formally discuss in
Appendix B.10.24
The ﬁnal step of the algorithm is to run an unrestricted gravity regression in which the
dependent variable are the simulated trade shares from l to n and the regressors are the trade
cost from l to n calibrated in the previous step, and two sets of country ﬁxed effects.
It is useful to study the implications of the model for average outward and inward trade
and MP costs, weighted by the size of the partner countries. Average outward MP costs
are informative about a country’s ability to take its ideas abroad while inward MP costs
are informative about a country’s ability to adopt foreign ideas. Innovation in equilibrium
is determined by these costs together with inward and outward trade costs, as shown in
Propositions 2 and 3. Figure 5 plots average inward and outward MP and trade costs for our
to the share of payments to workers in the innovation sector. This number is close to the 15-percent share of
income accrued to intangible capital in the United States, a number calculated by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel
(2009). Their estimates, however, include a two percent that corresponds to payments for advertising, branding,
etc. These costs are closer, in our model, to payments for marketing ﬁxed costs.
24The level of real income in our baseline calibration depends on the normalization, but its changes, for given
percentage changes in γil and τln, do not. Related to our approach, Burstein and Vogel (2012) use numerical
methods to estimate the level of trade frictions using a trade model where gravity relationships do not take
a simple analytical form. They also discuss how different restrictions on parameters affect the level of the
estimated parameters and counterfactuals, ﬁnding little effects by imposing, for example, symmetry on trade
costs.
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Figure 5: Average Calibrated MP and Trade Costs.
Note: Letting li ￿ Li/∑k Lk ande ll ￿ ll/∑n6=l ln, we compute τOUT
l ￿ ∑n6=l e lnτln, τIN
n ￿ ∑l6=ne llτnl,
γOUT
i ￿ ∑l6=ie llγil, γIN
l ￿ ∑i6=l e liγil.
sample of OECD countries.
Highlydevelopedeconomies, inparticularUnitedStates, Canada, Germany, GreatBritain,
France, and Benelux, appear very open in both dimensions, whereas Greece comes out as a
very closed economy. Other countries exhibit a more mixed set of costs. For example, Por-
tugal has high outward and low inward MP costs, while Norway has high inward and low
outward costs for both trade and MP.
Using the calibrated model, in the next Section we perform several counterfactual exer-
cises to understand the impact of trade and MP on innovation and welfare.25 Before doing
that, in the rest of this section we discuss the forces leading to high innovation rates in a
few small countries in the calibrated model, and assess some additional implications of the
calibrated model.
4.1 Understanding high innovation rates in small countries
In the data, Benelux, Denmark, Finland and Norway have large outward MP ﬂows relative
to their inward MP ﬂows, which goes hand-in-hand with high innovation rates in our model
(see Equation 16). Given the strong home market effects present in our model, such high
innovationratesinsmallcountriesmayseemparadoxical. Indeed, ifweeliminatedifferences
25In order not to have to take a stand on how current account imbalances change as we move from one
equilibrium to the other, we recompute the model’s equilibrium imposing current account balance and then
perform the counterfactuals. Thus, for example, the gains from openness do not confound the gains coming
directly from trade and MP and the gains coming indirectly from the effect of transfers on varieties available
for consumption.
27X L Y ∆/X w r
Australia 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.66 0.17
Austria 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.71 0.14
Benelux 0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.11 1.22 0.25
Canada 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.88 0.14
Denmark 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.21
Spain 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.97 0.15
Finland 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.11 1.06 0.21
France 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.93 0.18
Great Britain 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.75 0.14
Germany 0.26 0.38 0.28 -0.08 0.74 0.20
Greece 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.91 0.17
Italy 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.01 1.40 0.17
Japan 0.59 0.52 0.62 -0.06 1.20 0.20
Norway 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 1.13 0.22
New Zealand 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.43 0.07
Portugal 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.45 0.09
Sweden 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 1.09 0.18
United States 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.19
Table 3: Aggregate Variables: Model’s Calibration.
Note: The variables X and L refer to absorption and equipped labor in manufacturing, respectively, in the data
(relative to U.S.). The variables Y, ∆/X, w, and r, refer to output, current account deﬁcit (as a share of X),
wages, and the share of labor in innovation, respectively, as implied by the model’s equilibrium.
in trade and MP costs across countries (i.e., set τln = τ for all l 6= n and γil = γ for all i 6= l),
and set Te
i = 1 and T
p
i = L
1￿ρ
i for all i, so that the only difference across countries is size (Li),
then innovation rates ri would be strongly increasing in size Li thanks to the home market
effects discussed in Section 2.4. This point is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows ri under
(i) the calibrated parameters but setting all current account imbalances to zero (from here
onwards we refer to this as the “baseline calibration”), and (ii) as in (i) but setting trade and
MP costs at the average values in the calibrated model.26 The correlation between ri and Li
is 0.10 in the baseline calibration but raises to 0.86 when there are no differences in MP and
trade costs across country pairs. Thus, when all country pairs face the same MP frictions,
small and centrally located countries, like Benelux and Denmark, lose their advantage as
places for innovation, and become attractive places for production.
How does the calibrated model generate the high innovation rates for Benelux (and other
small nordic countries) implied by our data? The key force behind Benelux’s high r in the
calibrated model is the country’s low outward MP costs. This cost is on average γOUT
BEN = 1.57,
the lowest in our sample of countries – the second lowest average outward MP costs is for
26The average of γil for all i 6= l is 2.5, while the average of τln for all l 6= n is 2.7.
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Figure 6: Comparative Advantage and Home Market Effects
Note: r according to baseline calibration (country labels) and according to counterfactual equilibrium with all
trade and MP costs set at average values (solid curve).
Finland, with γOUT
FIN = 1.98. The low outward MP cost makes Benelux an attractive location
for innovation.27
4.2 Additional Implications
The calibrated model has additional implications, other than the ones explicitly used in the
algorithm above, that we can contrast with the data.
R&D employment shares. Figure 7 shows the innovation share in the model and in
the data relative to the United States. The innovation share in the model is ri from Table
3, while in the data it corresponds to R&D expenditures relative to local value-added for
the manufacturing sector (as in Figure 1). There is a strong positive correlation between
the two variables, in spite of the fact that R&D data were not used in the calibration of the
model. Whereas we model innovation in a simple, and rather restrictive way, our calibration
indicates that the model captures well the linkage between trade, MP and innovation.28
27Benelux also has a low inward MP cost, which by Proposition 3 would imply a low r, but this effect is
dominated by the effect of the low outward MP cost. To verify this claim, we conducted an experiment in
which we started with all trade and MP costs at their average values (as in the solid curve in Figure 6) and then
lowered the outward and inward MP costs of Benelux by 40% (i.e., γil = 0.6γ for i = BEN and l 6= BEN or
i 6= BEN and l = BEN). This resulted in an increase in Benelux’s r from 10.6% to 40.8%.
28The two variables are quite different in levels: The observed share of labor employed in R&D is an order
of magnitude lower than the model’s implied share, which revolves around 17 percent. There are two expla-
nations for this. First, the R&D data is for the whole economy, whereas R&D in manufacturing (which is what
we focus on) is higher. For example, the ratio of R&D to value added in the United States is 2.7 percent in the
whole economy and 8.7 percent in manufacturing. Second, R&D in the data captures only a small part of what
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Figure 7: Employment Shares in R&D: Model and Data.
Note: Employment Shares in R&D are: in the model, the (equilibrium) variable r; in the data, employment in
R&D, as a share of total employment, from the World Development Indicators, an average over the nineties.
Trade and MP costs. The estimated trade and MP costs should correlate to geographic
variables such as bilateral distance. To evaluate this relationship we regress the logarithm
of estimated trade and MP costs on origin and destination ﬁxed effects, the indicator vari-
able for distance, as in the gravity regressions above, and border and language dummies.
The estimated coefﬁcients are increasing in distance and decreasing in sharing a border and
language, and all the estimated coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. Figure 8
illustrates the strong positive relationship of calibrated trade and MP costs with geographical
distance.
Bridge MP. As discussed above, our calibration procedure implies a unique mapping
from observed bilateral trade and MP shares to simulated trilateral ﬂows, Xiln. We now
assess the ability of our model to predict these trilateral ﬂows for the case of i = US, which
is the only case for which we have the necessary data. By construction, the model matches
total MP ﬂows, so ∑n Xiln = ∑n b Xiln, where the Xiln refers to the data and b Xiln refers to the
model. But we can compare the composition of MP ﬂows across destinations between the
model and the data. We think of this as an “out of sample” check on the model.29
constitutes innovation in the model. A more interesting feature is whether the model captures the cross-country
pattern observed for this variable, which is what we focus on.
29As explained in Section 3.1, our data for trilateral ﬂows comes from the BEA and is restricted to Xiln for
i = US and the top ﬁve markets for US sales: Canada, European Union, Great Britain, Japan, and the United
States. It is important to emphasize here that these data Xiln were used in the calibration of the model only to
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Figure 8: Calibrated Trade and MP Costs and Geographical Distance.
Note: Calibrated trade costs refer to τln. Calibrated MP costs refer to e γil.
Following Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), we refer to MP sales sold outside of
the local market as “bridge” MP (BMP) ﬂows, since ﬁrms from i use l as a bridge to reach
another location n. We also refer to the ratio of total BMP ﬂows over total MP ﬂows as the
BMP share, which we measure as BMPil ￿ ∑n6=l Xiln/∑n Xiln. BMP shares predicted by the
model are lower than those in the data: averaging across all production locations in our data
set, the average BMP share in the model is 0.08 while in the data this is 0.39. This behavior
of the model is caused by the high value of the parameter ρ, which leads multinationals to
serve foreign markets through exports or MP, but not BMP. Indeed, when the parameter ρ is
lower, BMP shares go up. For ρ = 0.40—as calibrated using the Poisson PML coefﬁcients in
the unrestricted gravity regressions—, the average BMP share is 0.13 rather than 0.08.30
Apart from this failing, however, the model does a good job in matching the composition
of BMP ﬂows across destinations. The correlation between model and data BMP ﬂows in
logs (i.e., between logXiln and log b Xiln for n 6= l) is 0.78 –in levels, the correlation is 0.95–. Of
course, part of that is mere gravity: all ﬂows in the model and the data are much higher when
the destination market is large than when it is small. To proceed, we compare the trilateral
ﬂows implied by the model with a simple, yet intuitive, benchmark according to which the
export behavior of foreign afﬁliates and domestic ﬁrms is the same,
pin one parameter, ρ, but they were not used in the calibration of trade and MP costs. This implies that although
the model perfectly matches the bilateral trade and MP data, it does not do so for trilateral ﬂows.
30In fact, the share of BMP does not change with the parameter θ, but only with ρ.
31Xiln = ∑n Xiln
∑i,n Xiln
￿∑
i
Xiln.
Our calibrated mode implies systematic deviations from this benchmark because the afﬁli-
ates of U.S. ﬁrms have different location opportunities for producing for a country n than
other ﬁrms operating in country l.31
To test that the model has predictive power in excess of the simple benchmark, we esti-
mate the following econometric model via OLS:
Xiln ￿ ∑i,n Xiln
∑i Xiln ￿ ∑n Xiln
= b
b Xiln ￿ ∑i,n b Xiln
∑i b Xiln ￿ ∑n b Xiln
+ εiln, (25)
where l 6= n 2 fCanada, the E.U., Japan, the U.K., the U.S.g and εiln represents factors
outside the model. Our choice of destination countries n is limited by the availability of data.
The model has explanatory power in excess of the simple benchmark if the coefﬁcient b on
the model generated data is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Estimating (25) on the 82 observations for which we have the necessary data yields a
coefﬁcient estimate of b b of 0.69 with a heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error of 0.18 and
an R-squared value of 0.71. These results strongly suggest that the model does a good job in
matching the pattern of trilateral ﬂows observed in the data and far exceeds the predictive
power of the simple benchmark model.32
5 Counterfactual Experiments
Armed with our calibrated model, we proceed to address the questions that motivate our
study by performing a series of counterfactual experiments. We ﬁrst calculate the gains from
openness as well as the gains from trade and the gains from MP, according to the deﬁnitions
in Section 2.5. Next, we compute the effect of a decline in MP costs on innovation (under
endogenous entry), real income, and real wages of workers in the innovation and production
sectors. Finally, we analyze the effects on these same variables of the integration to the world
economy of a low-productivity country, an experiment that is motivated by the emergence
of China as a key location for manufacturing production over the last two decades.33
31The benchmark model in fact corresponds to the actual model analyzed in this paper when ρ = 0.
32When ﬁxed effects by destination country (n) and production country (l) are included in the regression, the
coefﬁcient on predicted trilateral ﬂows changes only moderately to 0.64 with a standard error of 0.21 and an
R-squared of 0.74.
33The reader should keep in mind that our model was calibrated to manufacturing, hence the welfare impli-
cations correspond to real variables deﬂated by the price index in manufacturing only.
32For these counterfactual exercises, in addition to the two versions of the model presented
in Section 2, we consider a version of the model with endogenous entry but heterogeneous
workers as in Roy (1951) (see the Appendix for details). This version of our model allows
us to address our questions concerning the effect of globalization on innovation, aggregate
welfare, and the distribution of income between innovators and workers in a single frame-
work. A critical parameter, which we label κ, captures the extent to which workers differ in
their relative productivities in the two activities.34 The model of Section 2 with endogenous
entry and homogeneous workers corresponds to a special case of this model with κ ￿! ∞.
We have some guidance from recent quantitative work for the value of this parameter, such
as Lagakos and Waugh (2013), and Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow (2013). Based on those
papers, we set κ = 3.
In the rest of this Section we refer to the three versions of the model as the linear model
(endogenous entry with homogeneous labor, κ ! ∞), the Roy model (endogenous entry
with heterogeneous labor, κ = 3) and the model with exogenous entry. The calibration of
each of these versions of the model is done exactly as described in Section 4: given that the
three versions of the model differ only in the speciﬁcation of the labor market, the implied
trade and MP costs are the same across speciﬁcations – see the Online Appendix for details.
In all the counterfactual exercises below, we ﬁrst remove the current-account imbalances by
computing the equilibrium with ∆i = 0 for all i. The resulting equilibrium is referred to as
the “baseline equilibrium” below.
5.1 The Gains from Openness
Table 4 presents the innovation rate r in the baseline equilibrium as well as the gains from
openness decomposed into the direct and indirect effects, as discussed in 2.5.35. A small
and open economy like Benelux derives enormous gains of moving from isolation to the
baseline equilibrium. These gains primarily stem from the direct effect, but being specialized
in innovation (as reﬂected in its high r), part of these gains come from a positive indirect
effect. Different is the case of a country with high net inward MP ﬂows like New Zealand, for
which the gains from openness are also large, but with a negative indirect effect. Germany,
Japan and the United States exhibit a pattern like that in Benelux, namely specialization in
innovation (r > η) and a positive indirect effect, whereas Canada, Spain and Great Britain
are examples of countries that, like New Zealand, are specialized in production (r < η) and
34Formally, we assume that workers independently draw their productivity in innovation and production
from a Fréchet distribution with parameter κ.
35The results in Table 4 correspond to the linear model – results for the Roy and exogenous entry versions of
the model are very similar and are therefore not reported.
33r GO GT GMP
overall direct indirect
Australia 0.167 1.156 1.190 0.972 1.004 1.028
Austria 0.149 1.443 1.528 0.945 1.068 1.029
Benelux 0.240 1.819 1.709 1.064 1.126 1.128
Canada 0.142 1.566 1.679 0.933 1.056 1.056
Denmark 0.215 1.394 1.346 1.035 1.118 1.038
Spain 0.148 1.128 1.197 0.943 0.993 0.9998
Finland 0.208 1.287 1.254 1.026 1.061 1.058
France 0.179 1.182 1.195 0.989 1.035 1.018
Great Britain 0.147 1.321 1.404 0.941 1.024 1.049
Germany 0.195 1.225 1.213 1.010 1.048 1.048
Greece 0.164 1.075 1.112 0.967 0.998 0.995
Italy 0.168 1.094 1.125 0.972 1.006 1.001
Japan 0.200 1.052 1.035 1.016 1.025 1.019
Norway 0.216 1.230 1.187 1.036 1.091 1.033
New Zealand 0.082 1.432 1.761 0.813 0.993 1.038
Portugal 0.109 1.489 1.706 0.873 1.018 1.036
Sweden 0.183 1.431 1.440 0.993 1.062 1.068
United States 0.192 1.083 1.077 1.006 1.016 1.023
Average 0.171 1.300 1.342 0.974 1.041 1.037
Table 4: Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP.
Note: The gains from openness refer to the gains of moving from isolation to the calibrated equilibrium. The
gains from trade (MP) refer to the gains of moving from an equilibrium with only MP (trade) to the calibrated
equilibrium with both trade and MP. “Direct” and “indirect” refer to the ﬁrst and second terms, respectively,
on the right-hand side of (21). The overall effect is the full right-hand side of (21).
have a negative indirect effect.
In Table 4 we also present the gains from trade and the gains from MP. These welfare
changes tend to be low, because trade and MP are substitutes: once an economy has access
to either trade or MP, then adding the other channel does not generate large additional gains
(see Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013)). Can trade or MP lead to welfare losses? Our
model yields an afﬁrmative answer, although the losses are always small. Spain, Greece
and New Zealand lose from trade, while Spain and Greece lose from MP. The explanation
for these effects is contained in Section 2.5. If calibrated inward MP costs are low relative
to calibrated outward MP costs, then lowering MP costs from inﬁnity to their calibrated
values (while leaving trade costs at their calibrated levels) leads to a reallocation of resources
from innovation to production, triggering a deterioration in the country’s terms of trade.
The same thing happens when lowering trade costs from inﬁnity to their calibrated values
(while leaving MP costs at their calibrated levels). As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table
4, equilibrium innovation in all the countries that lose from MP or trade is lower than its
34equilibrium level in the counterfactual with no MP or with no trade, i.e., ri < η.
We now quantify the gains from lowering all MP barriers by ﬁve percent for the three
versions of the model – results are presented in Table 5. Columns 1-2, 3-4 and 7-8 show
the percentage change in ri and Xi/Pi for the three different models. Columns 5-6 and 9-10
present the percentage change in the real wage in production (wi/Pi) and innovation (we
i/Pi)
in the Roy and exogenous-entry models.
MP liberalization generates a large reallocation of worldwide innovation efforts towards
the countries that have the highest innovation rates in the baseline equilibrium. This is espe-
cially noticeable in Benelux, where r increases by 77% in the linear model, 15.5% in the Roy
model and 5.8% in the exogenous-entry model. The strong increase in innovation in Benelux
is caused by the non-linear response of MP ﬂows to changes in MP costs – a ﬁve-percent
decline in γil when γil is low has a stronger effect than the same percentage decline in γil
when γil is high. The effect is much smaller according to the Roy model because of the in-
crease in the cost of innovation that results as innovation expands and absorbs workers with
lower relative productivity in that activity. In the exogenous-entry model the increase in r
is even smaller – since there is no labor reallocation in this case, the increase in r is purely a
reﬂection of higher wages in innovation relative to production.
Turning to the welfare implications of MP liberalization, we see that only Greece experi-
ences overall loses, and only according to the linear model. As explained in Section 2.5, ag-
gregate loses arise because of a reallocation of resources from innovation to production and
the associated terms of trade deterioration. Since this reallocation is smaller, or non-existent,
in the Roy and exogenous-entry models, loses are less likely in these models.
What happens to the real wages of workers that remain in the production sector? Propo-
sition 4 shows that, under exogenous entry, real production wages could fall with MP liber-
alization in a country with a mix of high innovation productivity and a large endowment of
innovation workers. The results in Table 5 show that this does not happen in our calibrated
economy: real production wages increase with MP liberalization in all the countries in our
sample.
Something very different happens with real innovation wages, which tend to fall with
MP liberalization in the countries that are net recipients of MP – for example, real innova-
tion wages decrease by 2% to 4% in Spain, New Zealand, Portugal and Greece according
to the Roy model and even more according to the exogenous-entry model. More broadly,
we see that real innovation wages tend to increase by more than real production wages in
the countries exhibiting net outﬂows of MP (e.g., Benelux, Denmark and Norway), whereas
the opposite happens in countries exhibiting net inﬂows of MP. Surprisingly, real production
35Linear Model Roy Model Exogenous-Entry Model
% change in: r X/P r X/P w/P we/P r X/P w/P we/P
Australia -1.6 1.5 -2.5 1.5 1.7 0.6 -1.9 1.6 2.0 -0.4
Austria -10.1 1.9 -7.7 1.9 2.4 -0.7 -3.8 1.9 2.6 -1.9
Benelux 76.9 6.9 15.5 5.2 3.4 10.3 5.8 4.6 2.7 10.6
Canada -3.1 2.9 -2.5 3.0 3.1 2.1 -0.8 3.1 3.2 2.3
Denmark 5.3 1.8 3.9 1.8 1.5 3.2 2.5 1.7 1.0 4.2
Spain -10.9 0.4 -8.0 0.6 1.1 -2.2 -5.7 0.9 1.9 -4.9
Finland 2.3 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.2 3.4 1.9 2.3 1.8 4.3
France -5.7 0.9 -2.3 1.1 1.2 0.3 -1.3 1.1 1.4 -0.2
Great Britain -11.5 2.3 -3.7 2.5 2.7 1.2 -1.0 2.6 2.8 1.6
Germany -8.8 2.4 1.2 2.1 2.0 2.5 0.9 1.9 1.7 2.9
Greece -6.6 -0.1 -5.4 0.0 0.4 -1.8 -4.3 0.2 1.1 -4.1
Italy -6.0 0.2 -4.5 0.3 0.6 -1.2 -3.2 0.5 1.2 -2.8
Japan 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 1.4
Norway 3.5 1.4 2.9 1.4 1.1 2.4 2.0 1.3 0.7 3.4
New Zealand -40.4 2.2 -19.0 3.0 3.5 -3.9 -7.7 3.3 4.0 -4.7
Portugal -22.4 2.5 -15.3 2.5 3.1 -3.0 -8.3 2.4 3.5 -6.1
Sweden -2.5 3.3 1.8 3.1 2.9 3.7 1.4 2.9 2.6 4.3
United States -2.9 0.8 -0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.5
average -2.4 1.9 -2.4 1.9 1.9 1.0 -1.3 1.9 2.0 0.6
Table 5: MP Liberalization: Linear, Roy, and Exogenous-Entry Model.
Note: MP liberalization refers to a ﬁve-percent decrease in all MP costs. we is the wage per efﬁciency unit in the
innovation sector. For the linear model, changes in X/P are equivalent to changes in w/P.
wages increase by more than real innovation wages in the United States with MP liberaliza-
tion, implying a decrease in the share of innovation wages in total income.
We explored how the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 change under our alternative
calibration with a higher θ. It is not surprising that the overall gains from openness are
lower with this parameter given the welfare expression (21): The average country gains 20%
versus 30% in our baseline calibration and as expected the difference is almost entirely due
to the direct effect. Moreover, the gains from MP for all countries are larger than one; that
is, no country loses from opening up to MP, even though a country like Greece has virtually
zero gains. Regarding the MP liberalization exercise, the alternative calibration delivers very
similar results to those in Table 5.
5.2 The Rise of the East
Perhaps the single most important event relevant to the questions addressed in this paper is
the emergence of China as a manufacturing center for ﬁrms from all over the world. In our
last counterfactual exercise, we analyze how China’s emergence may have affected innova-
36tion in different countries, as well as whether there could be a negative effect on workers in
rich countries. For the simple scenarios in which we could explore this question analytically,
propositions 4 and 5 showed that the effects of a decline in MP costs on real wages depend on
whether entry is endogenous or exogenous. In particular, it was shown how workers could
lose under exogenous entry but would always gain under endogenous entry – in the latter
case, the effect of integration would be an increase in innovation in the rich country, but no
negative effect on real wages. We now use the calibrated model to explore these questions at
a quantitative level.
To conduct this exercise, we think of our model calibrated with data for the late 1990s as
corresponding to a world in which China had not yet integrated with the rest of the world.
In the counterfactual, China is integrated with the countries in our sample with trade and
MP costs given by their (weighted) average in our calibrated model.36 Moreover, as we
did for all other countries, we set the size of China to equal its endowment of equipped
labor in manufacturing. The only parameters left to calibrate are Te
CH and T
p
CH. We set these
parameters so that the resulting equilibrium wage for China relative to the U.S. is equal to
that observed in the year 2010, i.e. wCH/wUS = 0.16, and the equilibrium innovation share is
equal to that of Portugal, which has the lowest innovation share in our sample, which implies
a target of rCH = 0.11.37
The results for the three versions of the model are presented in Table 6. Moving from the
baseline equilibrium to this counterfactual leads to an increase in r for all the countries in our
sample, with the notable exception of Benelux in the linear model. The increase in r is partic-
ularly high in New Zealand and Portugal – this is because these countries were specialized
in production according to the late 1990s data used for the calibration, and production moves
East with the integration of China into the world economy. This is reﬂected in the dramatic
decline in r in China as it becomes a key production site for ﬁrms from all over the world.38
Remarkably, however, real wages for workers in production do not fall in any of the
countries in our sample – see Table 6. In the linear model the negative effect on workers is
muted by the reallocation of labor from production to innovation. This was the main lesson
from Proposition 5 in Section 2.5. Something similar happens in the Roy model, although
worker heterogeneity implies that reallocation will not be as effective in helping production
36This implies that γi,CH = 2.9, γCH,l = 2.3, τl,CH = 4.1 and τCH,n = 2.8, for all i,l,n.
37The relative wage wCH/wUS is obtained as (YCH/LCH)/(YUS/LUS), where Li is equipped labor computed
as in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) and Yi is GDP in US dollars from the WDI.
38This implication of the model may seem inconsistent with the observed expansion of R&D taking place in
China in recent years. But one must keep in mind that our model is not designed to explain R&D variation
across countries or across time – we are only focusing on how trade and MP affect innovation while leaving
everything else out of the model. We could easily add a tax that increases the cost of innovation or decreases
its net returns as a way to generate such R&D variation, but this is outside the scope of this paper.
37Linear Model Roy Model Exogenous Entry
% change in: r X/P r X/P w/P we/P r X/P w/P we/P
Australia 24.2 5.5 21.5 5.2 3.7 12.3 17.8 4.6 0.7 23.3
Austria 18.2 4.8 17.1 4.3 3.3 10.0 15.4 3.7 0.8 19.7
Benelux -21.8 2.0 4.3 3.0 2.6 4.5 8.6 2.6 0.7 11.4
Canada 19.4 3.7 15.7 3.4 2.5 8.5 12.9 2.8 0.4 16.0
Denmark 19.1 5.0 16.6 5.1 3.5 10.7 13.6 4.8 0.8 19.0
Spain 12.7 4.3 12.7 4.0 3.3 8.3 12.2 3.3 1.1 15.9
Finland 14.0 12.2 12.3 12.0 10.7 16.4 10.8 11.0 7.9 23.1
France 12.8 3.6 12.1 3.5 2.6 7.5 11.2 3.0 0.5 14.5
Great Britain 24.5 4.2 18.3 3.7 2.7 9.7 14.5 3.2 0.4 18.2
Germany 23.2 4.2 16.7 4.2 2.8 9.7 13.2 3.9 0.4 17.6
Greece 24.8 13.2 22.7 12.6 10.9 20.5 19.7 11.4 7.0 33.4
Italy 7.8 5.7 8.2 5.5 4.9 8.3 8.4 4.8 3.1 13.7
Japan 8.0 2.6 8.2 2.7 2.0 5.4 7.9 2.5 0.5 10.7
Norway 8.9 21.9 9.1 21.5 20.5 25.1 9.0 20.1 17.2 31.0
New Zealand 88.9 8.0 46.6 5.5 4.2 19.8 30.9 5.2 0.8 37.7
Portugal 59.3 6.7 38.5 5.3 3.7 17.4 29.6 5.4 0.6 36.6
Sweden 6.7 5.7 8.8 5.7 5.0 8.7 9.6 5.0 2.8 15.1
United States 11.6 3.0 11.2 3.1 2.1 6.8 10.4 2.8 0.2 13.4
China -46.6 4.6 -44.9 5.8 9.4 -13.3 -46.5 10.4 22.2 -40.9
Table 6: The Rise of China: Linear, Roy, and Exogenous-Entry Model.
Note: we is the wage in the innovation sector. For the linear model, changes in X/P are equivalent to changes
in w/P.
workers share in the overall gains from specialization in innovation. Indeed, real wages
for production workers increase much less than for innovation workers. Not surprisingly,
this is even more pronounced when there is no mobility of labor between innovation and
production, asintheexogenous-entrymodel. Inthatcaseweﬁndthattheshareofinnovation
wages in total income experiences strong increases, ranging from approximately 10% in the
United States to 30% in New Zealand and Portugal. Remarkably, this does not mean that
production workers are negatively affected by the emergence of China. Returning again to
the case of the United States, our ﬁnding is that real production wages are basically not
affected while real innovation wages increase by 13%. The opposite occurs in China, where
real production wages increase by 22% while real innovation wages fall by 41%, resulting in
a 40% decline in the share of innovation wages in total income.
Does this mean that there is no basis for the popular fear that the move of manufacturing
to low wage countries can hurt production workers? To explore this further, we considered
a scenario that comes closer to that considered in Proposition 4. We start with MP costs at
their calibrated values and frictionless trade, and then consider a decline in MP costs from
the United States to China all the way down to zero costs, i.e., γUS,CH = 1. This is close to the
38conditions in Proposition 4, except that we have many countries and only consider friction-
less MP from the United States to China, while setting θ, σ and ρ at their calibrated values.
In this case production workers in the United States still come out better off, although real
production wages increase by only 5.5% whereas real innovation wages increase by 44% and
overall real income increases by 15%. The opposite pattern holds in China, where production
workers gain 86%, innovation workers lose 90%, and overall welfare increases by 74%.
6 Conclusion
The process of globalization features increasing international specialization in innovation or
production. To assess the welfare implications of this process, we develop a quantitative,
multi-country general equilibrium model where ﬁrms can serve a market by exporting from
their home country, by producing in the foreign market, or by exporting from a third loca-
tion. In making their location decisions, ﬁrms face a tradeoff: trade costs may induce ﬁrms
to open many plants to be near local customers but this is at the expense of producing in
the country with the lowest production cost. In the aggregate, countries that have a high
productivity in innovation relative to production tend to specialize in innovation but home
market effects lead production to concentrate in countries with large “market potential” and
draw innovation towards countries with large “production potential.”
OurquantiﬁcationofthisframeworkrevealsthatasymmetricbilateraltradeandMPcosts
play a critical role in determining the structure of global innovation and production. We also
demonstrate that falling MP costs generate efﬁciency gains but can make some countries
worse off, particularly when innovation is induced to leave a country, thereby exposing it to
a deterioration in its terms of trade. Within countries, workers with speciﬁc types of skills
can lose even as national welfare rises. Finally, we use our model to study the impact of the
integration of China into the global economy. We ﬁnd that despite having a large impact
on the structure of global specialization, with production largely migrating to China and
innovation migrating to the developed world, workers in the developed world largely gain.
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A Data Appendix
Data used for the restricted and unrestricted gravity estimations. The production data for
the restricted sample (Xiln, where i = U.S.) were assembled from several sources that depend
on the location of production l. For the case of l 6= U.S. (U.S. MP abroad), our data are
from the conﬁdential 1999 survey of the BEA of U.S. direct investment abroad. This legally
mandatory survey identiﬁes all U.S. ﬁrms that own productive facilities abroad. The survey
requires ﬁrms to report for their majority-owned, manufacturing afﬁliates the location of the
afﬁliates l, the sales of these afﬁliates to customers in their host country (l = n) and their
sales to customers in the United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and an aggre-
gation of a subset of countries in the European Union (l 6= U.S.,n).39 For the case of l = U.S.,
the data was constructed using a mixture of publicly available data and a conﬁdential sur-
vey conducted by the BEA on the activities of the U.S. afﬁliates of foreign ﬁrms. Aggregate
bilateral trade volumes in manufactures and aggregate domestic manufacturing sales were
collected from Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002) and the Census of Manufacturing respec-
tively. From these aggregates we subtracted the total contribution of foreign ﬁrms to these
sales using the BEA data set.
The data for the unrestricted sample (∑i Xiln) were also constructed using data from several
sources. The bilateral trade data (l 6= n) came from Feenstra et al. (2002) for the year 1999.
The domestic production data (l = n) was collected from the OECD for most developed
countries, from the INSTAT database maintained by UNIDO for many of the developing
countries, and for a few additional countries the domestic absorption data was obtained from
the estimates found in Simonovska and Waugh (2009). In the estimation we use only those
bilateral pair observations for which both Xiln and Xln are both nonzero and non-missing,
yielding a sample size of 316.
The data for trade frictions was drawn from several sources. The raw tariff data was ob-
tained from either the WTO or from the WITS web-site maintained by the World Bank. Tariffs
applied by a given country n can differ from their MFN levels across exporting countries l
39These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The BEA data for afﬁliate exports contains information on the
destination for only these four countries and for seven regions in total. Of these regions, only the European
countries share a common tariff.
43either because no tariff is applied, as when n = l or n and l are both in a free trade agree-
ment or customs union, or because country n extends GSP tariffs to a developing country l.
Data for distance (dln) and for the standard gravity controls (Hln) are from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et Informations Internationales (CEPII) web-site. To allow for non-linearities in the
effect of distance on trade cost, we constructed six categorical variables (D1 through D6) de-
ﬁned by the size of the distance.40 Finally, a dummy variable was included that takes a value
of one for the case in which l = n and a value of zero for the case l 6= n.
Datausedforthecalibrationprocedure. Allthedatausedforthecalibrationareaverages
over the period 1996-2001. Bilateral MP data is from UNCTAD, Investment and Enterprise
Program, FDI Statistics, FDI Country Proﬁles, published and unpublished data.41 The data
are on revenues of afﬁliates from country i in country l, and cover all non-ﬁnancial majority-
owned foreign afﬁliates.42 A foreign afﬁliate is deﬁned as a ﬁrm who has more than ten-
percent of its shares owned by a foreigner, while a majority-owned foreign afﬁliate is a ﬁrm
with more than ﬁfty-percent foreign ownership. The later type of foreign afﬁliates are the
largest part of the total number of foreign afﬁliates in a host economy.
The UNCTAD measure of MP includes both local sales in l and exports to any other coun-
try, including the home country i. Moreover, revenues of afﬁliates from country i in country
n can be captured by the receiving country n (inward), and by the source country i (outward).
Thus, potentially, each observation has two data sources. We consider ﬁrst outward magni-
tudes as reported by the source country, and complete with inward magnitudes as reported
by the receiving country. In this way, we minimize the underestimation arising from some
receiving countries reporting only local sales of foreign afﬁliates rather than total revenues.
Additionally, we minimize the problem of receiving countries that do not compile their sta-
tistics by reporting the country of the “Ultimate Beneﬁciary Owner” (i.e. the country of the
ultimate investor—by opposition to the country of the immediate investor).
Out of 342 possible country pairs, data are available for 219 country pairs. We impute
missing values by running OLS on
log
Yin
wnLn
= βd logdin + βcbin + βllin + Si + Dn + ein,
where Yin is revenues of afﬁliates from i in n, wnLn is GDP in country l, din is geographical
distance between i and n, bin (lin) is a dummy equal to one if i and n share a border (lan-
guage), and zero otherwise, and Si and Dn are two sets of country ﬁxed effects, for source
and destination country, respectively. The variable GDP is in current dollars, from the World
40The categories are less than 1,000km, between 1,000 and 3,000km, between 3000 and 6000km, between 6000
and 9000km, between 9,000 and 12,000km, and greater than 12,000 km.
41Unpublished data are available upon request at fdistat@unctad.org.
42The exception is Portugal that reports afﬁliates in all sectors including the ﬁnancial sector.
44Development Indicators.
The bilateral trade data and absorption data are from the OECD STAN manufacturing
database. Absorption Xn is calculated as gross value of production minus total exports plus
imports from OECD (18) countries.
B Theory Appendix
B.1 Properties of the Multivariate Pareto
(i)Weshowthatwith ρ ! 1theelementsof z areperfectlycorrelated, i.e. limρ!1 Gi(z1,...,zN) =
1￿maxl Tilz￿θ
l . Let x ￿ maxl Tilz￿θ
l andnotethat Gi(z1,...,zN) = 1￿x
￿
∑
N
l=1
￿
Tilz￿θ
l /x
￿ 1
1￿ρ
￿1￿ρ
.
As ρ ! 1 then ∑
N
l=1
￿
Tilz￿θ
l /x
￿ 1
1￿ρ ! 1, proving the result.
(ii) We also show that ρ = 0 is equivalent to the case of the production location l chosen
randomly with probabilities Til/e Ti among all possible locations l = 1,..., N, and the produc-
tivity Zl chosen from the Pareto distribution 1 ￿ e Tiz￿θ
l with zl ￿ e T1/θ
i . We simply need to
prove that for l 6= k we have Pr(Zl > e T1/θ
i \ Zk > e T1/θ
i ) = 0, and Pr(Zl ￿ zl \ Zk = e T1/θ
i
for all k 6= l) =
￿
Til/e Ti
￿￿
1￿ e Tiz￿θ
l
￿
. Note that with ρ = 0 the density associated with the
distribution above is zero, if it is evaluated at a point with Zv > e T1/θ
i for two or more v, while
Pr(Zl ￿ zl \ Zk = e T1/θ
i for all k 6= l) = 1 ￿
h
∑
N
k6=l Tik/e Ti + Tilz￿θ
l
i
=
￿
Til/e Ti
￿￿
1￿ e Tiz￿θ
l
￿
proving the result.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The (unconditional) probability that a ﬁrm from i will serve market n from l is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn ￿ c￿
n
￿
.
To compute this probability, note that,
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n,...,CiNn ￿ ciNn) = Pr
￿
Z1 ￿
ξi1n
ci1n
,...,ZN ￿
ξiNn
ciNn
￿
.
Assuming that cikn ￿ ξikne T￿1/θ
i for all k, then our assumption regarding the distribution of z
for ﬁrms in country i implies that
Pr
￿
Z1 ￿
ξi1n
ci1n
,...,ZN ￿
ξiNn
ciNn
￿
= 1￿
0
@
N
∑
k=1
"
Tik
￿
ξikn
cikn
￿￿θ# 1
1￿ρ
1
A
1￿ρ
. (B.1)
But we know that
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n,...,Ciln = ciln,...,CiNn ￿ ciNn) = ￿
∂Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n,...,Ciln = ciln,...,CiNn ￿ ciNn)
∂ciln
,
45hence from (B.1) we get
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n,...,Ciln = ciln,...,CiNn ￿ ciNn) = θ
0
@
N
∑
k=1
"
Tik
￿
ξikn
cikn
￿￿θ# 1
1￿ρ
1
A
￿ρ
￿
Tilξ￿θ
iln
￿ 1
1￿ρ c
θ/(1￿ρ)￿1
iln .
Notice also that if c < ξikne T￿1/θ
i for all k,
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn = c
￿
= Pr(Ci1n ￿ c,...,Ciln = c,...,CiNn ￿ c)
= θΨ
￿
ρ
1￿ρ
in
￿
Tilξ￿θ
iln
￿ 1
1￿ρ cθ￿1 = ψilnΨinθcθ￿1 .
Given Assumption 1 we know that c￿
in < ξikne T￿1/θ
i so that we can integrate the previous
expression over c from 0 to c￿
n to show that the probability that ﬁrms from i serving market n
will choose location l for production is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn ￿ c￿
n
￿
= ψilnΨin (c￿
n)
θ , (B.2)
while
Pr
￿
min
k
Cikn ￿ c￿
n
￿
= ∑
k
ψiknΨin (c￿
n)
θ = Ψin (c￿
n)
θ .
Hence,
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l j min
k
Cikn ￿ c￿
n
￿
= ψiln;
QED.
B.3 Derivations of Equations 9 and 7
Multiplying (B.2) by the measure of ﬁrms in i, Mi, and using (3), we get the measure of ﬁrms
from i that serve market n from location l,
Miln = MiψilnΨin
￿
σwnFn
Xn
￿￿θ/(σ￿1) Pθ
n
e σ
θ . (B.3)
Since the sales of a ﬁrm with cost c in a market n are e σ
1￿σXnPσ￿1
n c1￿σ, equation (5) implies
that total sales from n to l by ﬁrms from i, Xiln, are
Xiln = MiψilnΨine σ
1￿σXnPσ￿1
n
Z c￿
n
0
θcθ￿σdc.
Solving for the integral, using (3) and simplifying yields
Xiln =
e σ￿θθ
θ ￿ σ + 1
MiψilnΨin (σwnFn)
(θ￿σ+1)/(1￿σ) X
θ/(σ￿1)
n Pθ
n. (B.4)
Combining (B.4) and (B.3) yields (9). In turn, the formula for the price index in (1) together
with the pricing rule in (2), the density in (5), and the cut-off in (3) imply that
P￿θ
n = ζθ
￿
wnFn
Xn
￿(θ￿σ+1)/(1￿σ)
∑
k
MkΨkn, (B.5)
where ζ ￿
￿
e σ1￿σθ
θ￿σ+1
￿1/θ ￿
σ
e σ1￿σ
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1). Plugging this result into (B.4), we obtain (7) by noting
that λE
in is given by expression (8).
46B.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Using the equilibrium conditions for the case of free entry and setting τln = 1 and γil = 1 for
all i,l,n, we get that
Ψin = Te
i
"
∑
k
￿
T
p
k w￿θ
k
￿ 1
1￿ρ
#1￿ρ
￿ Ψi , (B.6)
and we can write
λE
in =
MiTe
i
∑k MkTe
k
￿ λE
i ,
and
λT
ln =
￿
T
p
l w￿θ
l
￿1/(1￿ρ)
∑k
￿
T
p
k w￿θ
k
￿1/(1￿ρ) ￿ λT
l .
These expressions imply that the labor market clearing and zero-proﬁt conditions (i.e., equa-
tions 13 and 15) can be written as
1
e σ
￿
T
p
i w￿θ
i
￿1/(1￿ρ)
∑k
￿
T
p
k w￿θ
k
￿1/(1￿ρ) ∑
k
wkLk + wiMif e = wiLi
￿
1￿
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
￿
, (B.7)
and
wi = η
Te
i /f e
∑k MkTe
k ∑
k
wkLk. (B.8)
Recalling that Mif e = Le
i, and combining (B.7) and (B.8) yields
ri ￿
Mif e
Li.
=
￿
1￿
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
￿
￿
1
e σ
f e
η
h
T
p
i
￿
Te
i
￿￿θi1/(1￿ρ)
∑k
h
T
p
k
￿
Te
k
￿￿θi1/(1￿ρ)
∑k MkTe
k
Te
i Li
.
Noting that 1￿ θ￿σ+1
σθ = η + 1/e σ, and letting Ai ￿
￿
T
p
i
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/Li gives
ri =
1
e σ
0
B
@1￿
f e
η
Ai/
￿
Te
i
￿θ/(1￿ρ)
∑k AkLk/
￿
Te
j
￿θ/(1￿ρ)
∑j MjTe
j
Te
i
1
C
A + η. (B.9)
Finally, notice that by the deﬁnition of ri, we have Mi = riLi/f e, which can be substituted in
(B.9) to construct the term
∑
k
MkTe
k = η
∑k LkTe
k
f e . (B.10)
Replacing back in (B.9) and deﬁning δi ￿ LiTe
i /∑k LkTe
k, we ﬁnally obtain (20) and the
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this expression to hold, as indicated in the Proposition.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) First, as a preliminary result, we establish that if L1 > L2, then ω ￿ w1/w2 > 1.
The absence of trade costs implies that λE
in ￿ λE
i for any i,n (For future reference, note that
this implies that λE
1 + λE
2 = λE
11 + λE
21 = 1) and that Ψin ￿ Ψi for any i,n. The zero-proﬁt
47condition, Equation (15), implies
Le
1 = ηλE
1(L1 + L2/ω), (B.11)
Le
2/ω = ηλE
2(L1 + L2/ω). (B.12)
Using these equations together with the deﬁnition of λE
i , which implies that
λE
i =
MiΨin
∑k MkΨkn
=
MiΨi
∑k MkΨk
, (B.13)
and Mif e = Le
i, we have ω = Ψ1/Ψ2.
Using the deﬁnition of Ψin and the assumption of A1 = A2, we can obtain after some
derivations
L1
L2
= ω
θ
1￿ρ ω1/(1￿ρ) ￿ γ￿θ/(1￿ρ)
1￿ γ￿θ/(1￿ρ)ω1/(1￿ρ) . (B.14)
The right hand side (RHS) of this equation is increasing in ω which implies that ω is increas-
ing in L1/L2. Since L1/L2 = 1 implies ω = 1, then L1/L2 > 1 implies ω > 1, which proves
the preliminary result.
Second, using the previous result we can prove that if L1 > L2 then r1 > r2. The proof is
by contradiction. Suppose that r1 < r2. From the labor market clearing condition, Equation
(13), and from (14) and λT
in = λT
i ￿ λT
ii, we have
wiLe
i = wiLi
￿
1￿
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
￿
￿
1
e σ
λT
i ∑
k
wkLk =)
ri = η + 1￿ 1/σ ￿
1
e σ
λT
i ∑k wkLk
wiLi.
If r1 < r2 then labor market clearing in the two countries requires
λT
1
w1L1
>
λT
2
w2L2
(B.15)
Using the deﬁnition for λT
l , the result λE
in = λE
i , and (B.11) and (B.12), after some derivations
expression (B.15) implies
L2r2ω
ρ
1￿ρ
￿
γ￿θ/(1￿ρ) ￿ ωθ/(1￿ρ)+1
￿
> L1r1
￿
ωθ/(1￿ρ)+1γ￿θ/(1￿ρ) ￿ 1
￿
,
which will ﬁnally allow us to prove the result by contradiction. Note that when L1 > L2
we have ω > 1, so that the term in parentheses on the left-hand-side of this inequality is
negative. If ωθ/(1￿ρ)+1γ￿θ/(1￿ρ) ￿ 1, then the inequality is violated and the desired contra-
diction is shown. Alternatively, if ωθ/(1￿ρ)+1γ￿θ/(1￿ρ) < 1 we can substitute out L2/L1 from
the inequality using (B.14) to arrive at an expression that given the assumption that θ > 1
contradicts the initial assertion that r1 < r2. Thus, since this assertion leads to a contradiction
in all cases, we conclude that r1 > r2, which completes the proof of part i).
Part (ii) To simplify the notation, without loss of generality, we assume that Te
1 = Te
2 = 1
and use Ti as shorthand for T
p
i . Frictionless MP implies that Ψin = Ψn for any i, j,n and
λE
ij = Mi/(M1 + M2) for any i, j. The labor market clearing in production and marketing is
48given by (13), which in this case implies
w1L
p
1 =
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
X1 +
1
e σ
h
λT
11w1L1 + λT
12w2L2
i
.
But given the absence of MP costs and the implication that Ψin = Ψn for any i, then this
equation can be rewritten as
w1L
p
1 =
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
X1 +
1
e σ
￿
T1w￿θ
1
￿ 1
1￿ρ h
Ψ
￿1/(1￿ρ)
1 w1L1 + τ￿θ/(1￿ρ)Ψ
￿1/(1￿ρ)
2 w2L2
i
.
In an interior solution, when both countries innovate, we must have w1 = w2, or else only the
lower wage country would innovate. We normalize this wage to one. Using the deﬁnition of
Ψin, and given the assumption that Ai ￿ T
1/(1￿ρ)
i /Li we have Ψin =
h
∑k AkLkτ
￿θ/(1￿ρ)
kn
i1￿ρ
.
Finally, using symmetry A1 = A2 = A and letting t ￿ τ￿θ/(1￿ρ) and l1 ￿ L1/(L1 + L2) we
get the above expression to be
L
p
1
L1
=
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
+
1
e σ
￿
l1
t + l1(1￿ t)
+
t(1￿ l1)
1￿ l1(1￿ t)
￿
.
and similarly for the second country. Noting that ri = 1￿ L
p
i /Li, we have1
r1 = η
￿
1+ θ
t(1￿ t)(1￿ l1)(1￿ 2l1)
(l1 + (1￿ l1)t)(l1t + (1￿ l1))
￿
r2 = η
￿
1+ θ
t(1￿ t)l1(2l1 ￿ 1)
(l1 + (1￿ l1)t)(l1t + (1￿ l1))
￿
It is clear from these expressions that for any l1 2 (1/2,1) that r1 < η and r2 > η, QED.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of both parts comprises of a number of straightforward algebraic steps for which
we simply sketch the intuition. In both cases, we solve for r1 using the labor market clearing
(13) and free entry conditions (15). Then, imposing alternatively frictionless trade or MP
results in expressions in terms of the ψiln, which determine the size of r1 relative to η. For
part (i), frictionless trade but costly MP, showing that r1 > η requires showing that θw1/w2 >
ψ211/ψ121. This inequality can be shown to hold using the deﬁnition of ψiln and by proving
that γ12 < γ21 =) w1/w2 > 1. For part (ii), frictionless MP but costly trade, we need to
show r1 < η. Here, the derivations imply that r1 = η + σ￿1
σ
￿
λT
21 ￿ λT
12
￿
, and the inequality
can be shown to be true as long as ψ112 > ψ121 =) λT
21 < λT
12. This last condition follows
from τ21>τ12. In both parts, it is easy to show that, r1 > η =) r2 < η.
B.7 Real Wage in Terms of Flows
We prove two lemmas that characterize the real wage and real expenditure under exogenous
and endogenous entry.
49Lemma 2 Under exogenous entry, real wages are given by
wn
Pn
= κn
￿
Te
nT
p
n Mn
￿1
θ
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ ￿
1
e σ
Yn
Xn
+
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1)
, (B.16)
and real expenditure is given by
Xn
Pn
1
Ln
= κn
￿
Te
nT
p
n Mn
￿1
θ
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ ￿
1
e σ
Yn
Xn
+
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1)￿1
,
where κn ￿ ζ (Fn/Ln)
σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1).
Proof: We start with the deﬁnition of λT
ln, Equation (10). Using also the deﬁnitions of ψiln
and ξiln, setting l = n and solving for wn, we have
wn =
2
6
4
λT
nn
∑k
￿
Tknγ￿θ
kn /Ψkn
￿1/(1￿ρ)
λE
kn
3
7
5
￿(1￿ρ)/θ
.
Using the result for the Dixit-Stiglitz price index in (B.5), ζ ￿
￿
e σ1￿σθ
θ￿σ+1
￿1/θ ￿
σ
e σ1￿σ
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1), and
noting that the deﬁnition of λE
in implies that ∑k MkΨkn = MnΨnn/λE
nn, we can write
Pn = ζ￿1
"￿
wnFn
Xn
￿1￿θ/(σ￿1) MnΨnn
λE
nn
#￿1/θ
.
Combining the two previous expressions and using Tin = Te
i T
p
n, we get
wn
Pn
= ζ
￿
Te
nT
p
n Mn
￿1/θ ￿
λT
nn
￿ ρ￿1
θ ￿
λE
nn
￿￿1
θ
"
∑
k
￿
Te
kγ￿θ
kn
Ψnn
Ψkn
￿ 1
1￿ρ
λE
kn
#1￿ρ
θ ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1)
.
(B.17)
Notice that using (7), the deﬁnition of ψiln, and simplifying, we get
∑
k
￿
Te
kγ￿θ
kn
Ψnn
Ψkn
￿ 1
1￿ρ
λE
kn =
(Te
n)
1
1￿ρ λE
nn
Xnnn/∑i Xinn
.
Plugging this into (B.17), and using the deﬁnitions of λT
nn, and λE
nn, we get that the real wage
is given by
wn
Pn
= ζ (Te
nMn)
1/θ
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿ σ￿1￿θ
θ(σ￿1)
. (B.18)
Under restricted entry, the labor market clearing condition is given by (13), which implies
wnLn =
1
e σ
Yn +
θ ￿ σ + 1
θσ
Xn .
Solving this equation for wn/Xn and substituting in (B.18) leads to equation (B.16) for real
wages. To derive Xn/Pn = (Xn/wn)￿(wn/Pn), we simply use the expression for real wages
and we obtain the ratio Xn/wn using the labor market clearing condition above. This last
step completes the proof; QED.
Lemma 3 Under endogenous entry, real wage and real expenditure are given by
wn
Pn
=
Xn
Pn
1
Ln
= κn (Te
nMn)
1/θ
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿ρ
θ ￿
∑l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
ρ
θ
. (B.19)
50Proof: This follows immediately from imposing Xn = wnLn in (B.18), QED.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 4
The assumption
￿
T
p
i
￿1/(1￿ρ)
/L
p
i = ˜ A implies that Tii = Te
i T
p
i = Te ￿
L
p
i
￿1￿ρ
. Let m ￿
∑k Mk/∑ L
p
k, let Wi be the real wage in country i under frictionless trade and no MP, and let
W￿
i be the real wage in country i under frictionless trade and MP and deﬁne li ￿ L
p
i /∑k L
p
k
and mi ￿ Te
i Le
i/L
p
i . We ﬁrst characterize the expressions for welfare under restricted entry in
the following Lemma, which we prove in the online appendix.
Lemma 4 Under restricted entry, consider a world where e Ai = e A, Te
i = Te for all i, and where
mi
m <
(θ+1)(θσ￿σ+1)
(θ￿σ+1) for all i, and assume ρ ! 1. The ratio of the real wage under frictionless trade
and MP to the real wage under free trade and no MP, Wi ￿ W￿
i /Wi, is given by the expression
(Wi)
θ =
[(1￿ η)m + ηmi]
υ m1￿υ
m
θ/(1+θ)
i ∑k m
1/(1+θ)
k lk
, (B.20)
where υ ￿ θ/(σ ￿ 1) ￿ 1.
With the help of this Lemma, we can now proceed to prove the two parts of the proposi-
tion. Notice that around symmetry mi ’ m, the restriction in the lemma is always satisﬁed,
so that we can make use of the lemma for proving Proposition 4.
Part (i) We ﬁrst show that real wages increase iff σ < ¯ θ ￿
(1+θ)
2
1+θ+θ2. To do that, we will use
the above lemma. Taking logs of (B.20), differentiating with respect to the size of one country
mi, and evaluating at symmetry, mi = m for all i, we get that the sign of this derivative is
determined by
υ[(1￿ η)li + η] + (1￿ υ)li ￿
θ
1+ θ
￿
1
1+ θ
li ,
or equivalently, by the sign of υη ￿ θ
1+θ . The condition υη > θ
1+θ is equivalent to σ <
(1+θ)
2
1+θ+θ2 ￿ ¯ θ, which proves part i).
Part (ii) Now consider real expenditures. Deﬁning Wi ￿ wi/Pi, with no MP we have
Xi/Pi =
Wi
1￿ η
,
whereas with frictionless trade and MP we have
X￿
i /P￿
i =
Xi
Yi
W￿
i
1￿ η
.
Consider the ratio, Xi ￿
￿
X￿
i /P￿
i
￿
/(Xi/Pi), and solve for Xi/Yi (see Online Appendix),
Xi =
￿
1￿ η + η
mi
m
￿ W￿
i
Wi
,
and hence, using (B.20),
Xi =
 
[(1￿ η)m + ηmi]
υ+θ m1￿υ+θ
m
θ/(1+θ)
i ∑k m
1/(1+θ)
k lk
!1/θ
.
51This expression is similar to what we had above for real wages, only that instead of υ we now
have υ+θ. Thus, the condition for real income to increase is that (υ + θ)η > θ
1+θ. Notice that
this condition is equivalent to θ > σ ￿ 1, which we always require for the various integrals
to have a ﬁnite mean. Thus, real expenditure must increase with MP.
In a similar manner we can show that real proﬁts increase under frictionless trade and
MP. Proﬁts in country i are Πi = Xi ￿ wiL
p
i , so that real proﬁts per person of country i
are πi = xi ￿ Wi. With frictionless trade and no MP we have xi = Wi/(1￿ η), so that
πi = Wiη/(1￿ η), while with frictionless trade and MP we have π￿
i = W￿
i
mi
m η/(1￿ η).
This implies that
π￿
i
πi
=
mi
m
W￿
i
Wi
,
and hence,
π￿
i
πi
=
[(1￿ η)m + ηmi]
υ m￿υ
m
￿ 1
1+θ
i ∑k m
1/(1+θ)
k lk
.
Taking logs, differentiating, and evaluating at symmetry, we obtain
1
m
(1￿ li)
￿
υη +
1
1+ θ
￿
,
which is always positive, implying that real proﬁts are higher with free MP versus no MP;
QED.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove Proposition 5 we ﬁrst compute the real wage under two scenarios: (i) frictionless
trade and frictionless MP; and (ii) frictionless trade but no MP. Then we will compare the
two.
(i) Frictionless trade and frictionless MP. From (B.8) and wN = 1 we get
wn = Te
n/Te
N . (B.21)
Using (B.10), which holds in the case of frictionless trade and MP, together with (B.6), (14)
and (B.21), to replace into the price index (equation B.5), we obtain the real wage in country
n under frictionless trade and MP,
wn
Pn
= ζη1/θTe
n/f e
"￿
Fn
Ln
￿(θ￿σ+1)/(1￿σ) ￿
∑k
h
T
p
k (Te
k/f e)
￿θ
i1/(1￿ρ)￿1￿ρ ￿
∑k
LkTe
k
f e
￿#1/θ
.
(B.22)
(ii) Frictionless trade but no MP. Given that there is no MP, trade is balanced so that Xn =
Yn and Le
n = ηLn for all n. Therefore the current account balance in (14) together with the
fact that all income is accrued to labor, Xn = wnLn, and Le
n = ηLn imply wnLn = ∑k λE
nkXk.
But since there is frictionless trade but no MP, then by replacing for the deﬁnition of λE
in, the
52current account balance can be written as
wnLn =
MnTe
nT
p
nw￿θ
n
∑k MkTe
kT
p
k w￿θ
k
∑
k
Xk.
Choosing country N labor as the numeraire, and using Mn = rnLn/f e with rn = η, the above
expression implies that wages can be expressed as
wn =
 
Te
nT
p
n
Te
NT
p
N
! 1
1+θ
. (B.23)
Also, note that by using (B.23) and the fact that in this case Ψin = Te
i T
p
i w￿θ
i we have that
∑
k
MkΨkn = η
￿
Te
NT
p
N/f e￿ θ
1+θ ∑
k
Lk
￿
Te
kT
p
k /f e￿ 1
1+θ .
Finally, we get the real wage by substituting the above relationship and Xn = wnLn into the
price index (equation B.5), and using (B.23),
wn
Pn
= ζη1/θ
"￿
Fn
Ln
￿ θ￿σ+1
1￿σ
∑
k
Lk
￿
Te
kT
p
k /f e￿ 1
1+θ
#1/θ
￿
Te
nT
p
n/f e￿ 1
1+θ (B.24)
Comparison. To prove our result we simply need to show that (B.22) is larger than (B.24),
or equivalently,
8
<
:∑
k
"
T
p
k
￿
Te
k
f e
￿￿θ#1/(1￿ρ)9
=
;
1￿ρ
￿
"
T
p
n
￿
Te
n
f e
￿￿θ# θ
1+θ
∑
j
LjTe
j
∑k LkTe
k
2
4T
p
j
 
Te
j
f e
!￿θ3
5
1
1+θ
. (B.25)
Note that the right-hand side of this expression is less than or equal to maxk T
p
k
￿
Te
k
f e
￿￿θ
. We
can then write the inequality as,
∑
k
"
T
p
k
￿
Te
k
f e
￿￿θ#1/(1￿ρ)
￿
"
max
k
T
p
k
￿
Te
k
f e
￿￿θ#1/(1￿ρ)
,
which is always true. QED.
B.10 Algorithm for Calibration and Simulations
The algorithm for calibration is divided in three steps explained below.
Step 1. We infer some of the aggregate equilibrium variables in the model using data on
bilateral trade and MP shares, absorption and size of country i. We focus here on the model
with endogenous entry and homogenous labor (i.e., the linear model), and later discuss how
the calibration of the other two models can be trivially derived from this calibration.
1. Output Yl is calculated using data on trade shares and absorption,
Yl = ∑
n
λT
lnXn.
2. National income is given by
wiLi =
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
(Xl ￿Yl) + (1￿ η)Yl + η∑
l
λM
il Yl.
53This equation is obtained by combining (13) and (15) with (11) summed over all l’s.
Given wiLi and our measure of Li as equipped labor we can then recover the implicit
wage, wi.
3. In our model, current accounts are balanced, which implies Xi = wiLi. But this rela-
tionship is not satisﬁed in the data. We follow Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008) and
simply assume that there is an exogenous current account deﬁcit, ∆i, which allows ex-
penditure, Xi, to be different than total income, wiLi,
∆i = Xi ￿ wiLi.
4. We infer the share of labor in innovation using (16).
5. The N ￿ 1 vector of entrants M is given by
Mi = riLi/f e
i = riLi,
where we have assumed that f e
i = 1.
Step 2. In this step we use the data and the aggregate variables recovered in Step 1
together with the model restrictions to recover trade and MP costs. Deﬁne e γil ￿ Tilγ￿θ
il .
We impose e γii = L
1￿ρ
i and τll = 1.43 We also impose τll = 1. Given a value for θ and ρ,
the aggregate variables computed in Step 1 and an initial guess for the matrices of e γil’s and
τln’s, we use expressions (8), (10), and (11) to compute compute λT
ln and λM
il in the model.
We iterate on the matrices of e γil’s and τln’s to precisely match the observed trade and MP
shares.44 For future reference, note that e γil and τln together with wages and fθ,ρg allow us
to recover the variables ψiln, λE
in, and Xiln implied by the model.
Step 3. To ﬁnalize the calibration of the model, we iterate on the value of the parameter θ
such that we match the “unrestricted” gravity coefﬁcient in the data, by running OLS in the
simulated data,
logλT
ln = βu logτln + Dn + Sl + uln. (B.26)
When we use the Poisson PML estimator of the unrestricted gravity coefﬁcient, we run the
corresponding procedure with the simulated data.
The procedure described so far applies to the linear model. For the exogenous entry
model we the values for θ, ρ, fτlng and fe γilg calibrated above and in addition set Le
i =
riLi and L
p
i = (1￿ ri) Li. It is trivial to show that the exogenous entry model with these
parameters yields the same equilibrium as the endogenous entry model as calibrated above.
A similar argument applies to the Roy model (see Appendix B.11 and the online appendix).
43The normalization e γii = L
1￿ρ
i can be seen as the result of assuming Te
i = 1, T
p
l = L
1￿ρ
l and γii = 1.
44We do not impose any bound on τ’s. Notice also that, for this step, we do not really need θ; we just can
redeﬁne e τln ￿ τ￿θ
ln .
54Calibration and the normalization
We now explain why the normalization that we impose in Step 2 (i.e., e γii = L
1￿ρ
i ) does not
affect the results of the counterfactual exercises that we conduct with the calibrated model.
In particular, we consider a percentage change of MP and trade costs and show that the
resulting change in the equilibrium variables does not depend on the normalization. We
focus on the linear endogenous entry model; extending the result to the exogenous entry
model and the Roy model is straightforward.
The ﬁrst step is to show that the calibrated values of θ and ρ do not depend on the nor-
malization. Since the trade elasticity estimated from the restricted gravity regression pins
down their ratio, we only need to show that the trade elasticity estimated from the unre-
stricted gravity regression (for the model) in step 3 is not affected by the normalization. The
normalization in step 2 does affect the estimated trade costs, which are used in step 3. But
such effects are absorbed by the exporter and importer ﬁxed effects in the regression of step
3, leaving the estimated coefﬁcient on the bilateral trade cost unaffected.
The second step is to show that even if the calibrated values of e γ and τ do depend on
the normalization, the proportional changes in the variable of interest given proportional
changes in e γ and τ do not depend on the normalization. We use the hat symbol (ˆ) to denote
theratioofthevalueofavariableinthenewequilibriumtoitsvalueintheinitialequilibrium,
ˆ x ￿ x0/x. We consider proportional changes in γ or T (which imply changes in e γ), and τ.
Denote changes in all these parameters as the vector ˆ Θ =
￿
ˆ γ, ˆ T, ˆ τ
￿
. Step 1 of the calibration
provides a set of variables λT, λM, X, Y, and w which do not depend on the normalization,
which is only used in step 2. These variables serve as calibration targets in step 2. We now
show that changes in wages, ˆ w, total expenditure, ˆ X, and entry, ˆ M, are determined from
a system of equations that depends only on ˆ Θ and the variables that serve as targets in
our calibration algorithm, but not directly on e γ and τ. To do so, note that we can use the
deﬁnition of Ψin and equations (11) and (10) to write ˆ Ψ = h1
￿ ˆ Θ, ˆ w, ˆ M
￿
, ˆ λ
M
= h2
￿ ˆ Θ, ˆ w, ˆ M
￿
,
ˆ λ
T
= h3
￿ ˆ Θ, ˆ w, ˆ M
￿
, where the functions h1, h2 and h3 do not depend on the T and γ. Using
these deﬁnitions and proceeding as in Dekle et al. (2008) we can reformulate our equilibrium
system in changes,
θ ￿ σ + 1
σθ
ˆ XiXi +
1
e σ ∑
n
ˆ λ
T
inλT
in ˆ XnXn = ˆ wiwi
￿
Li ￿ ˆ MiMif e￿
,
η∑
n
ˆ λ
M
il λM
il Yl = ˆ MiMi ˆ wiwif e,
ˆ XiXi = ˆ wiwiLi + ∆i.
The important point here is that this system allows us to solve for
￿
ˆ w, ˆ M, ˆ X
￿
as a function
of target variables λT, λM, X, Y, and w. Having solved this system computing real wage
changes is straightforward. We use expression (B.5) and the deﬁnition of Ψii to write changes
55in the price index as
b Pi =
￿
b wi/b Xi
￿ 1+θ￿σ
θ(σ￿1) ￿
b Mib Ψii/b λ
E
ii
￿￿1/θ
.
B.11 The Roy model
The setup of our Roy model extension is the same as the one in the baseline model. The
difference lies in that there is workers are heterogeneous regarding their abilities in innova-
tion and production/marketing. These workers can choose to work in the innovation sector,
where the wage per efﬁciency unit is we
i, or the production sector, where the wage per ef-
ﬁciency unit is wi. To model worker heterogeneity, we assume that workers independently
draw a pair of abilities, ve and vp, corresponding to the innovation and production sector,
from a Fréchet distribution, exp[￿v￿κ], with κ > 1, similar to Lagakos and Waugh (2013)
and Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow (2011). The ﬁnal productivity of a worker in the pro-
duction and innovation sectors are Aivp and Aive, where Ai is a neutral productivity variable
that we introduce so that the initial equilibrium is consistent with both the linear model and
the Roy model after a suitable choice of Ai as explained in Appendix B.10. A worker with
ability pair (ve,vp) would work in the innovation sector if and only if vewe
i ￿ vpwi. From
the properties of the Fréchet distribution, it is straightforward to show that the supply of
efﬁciency units to the innovation and production/marketing sectors, in country i, are given
by
Le
i = γLiAi
"
1+
￿
we
i
wi
￿￿κ#1/κ￿1
, (B.27)
and
L
p
i = γLiAi
￿
1+
￿
we
i
wi
￿κ￿1/κ￿1
, (B.28)
respectively, where γ is some positive constant.
The equilibrium levels of X, M, we, w are determined solved using (13) by setting Li ￿
Mif e = L
p
i , and using (B.28), (14) (15), and by the labor market clearing in innovation,
Mif e = Le
i, with Le
i replaced by (B.27).
The calibration of the Roy model is a simple extension of the one done for the linear
model. We simply choose Ai so that, together with the values for θ, ρ, fτlng and fe γilg cali-
brated in Section 4, the Roy model yields the same equilibrium as the linear model.
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